Boeing air crashes may have been caused by lack of safety features sold as optional extras

[WindKnight]

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/21/business/boeing-safety-features-charge.html

So, essentially a lot of people may have died because Boeing wanted to make extra money charging for safety features they are now installing as standard on all 737 Max 8's after the crashes.

Now even if it turns out this had nothing to do with the crashes, the fact they were trying to make an extra buck off of basic safety features is pretty f***ing despicable.

 

[Lufia Erim]

In real life microtransactions

 

[JoJo]

I saw some people loading up on cheap Boeing stock in the aftermath of the crash. Looks like this may have been one bandwagon not to jump on.

 

[Silentpony_v1legacy]

Well this is going to escalate very quickly

 

[Xprimentyl]

@sneakypenguin, you forgot to mention in your thread questioning why more people aren?t pilots that the all the safety mechanisms on planes that make flight statistically safer than traditional ground travel are only provided on the LX models.

 

[Worgen]

Wasn't privatizing air travel supposed to make it better

Actually for the most part privitizing it has worked fine, but we always used to have a decently funded FAA to provide oversight. Now it sounds like the FAA is underfunded to the point where they have to work with manufacturers to kinda do their job, so less of an enforcement agency and more of a... please be nice and do nice things, agency.

 

[Adam Jensen_v1legacy]

Wow, it's almost as if the deregulation is dangerous or something.

 

[Canadamus Prime]

I was going to go on a huge rant about how unregulated capitalism is fucking stupid, but I'll just quote Adam Jensen instead.

Wow, it's almost as if the deregulation is dangerous or something.

...yeah that'll do.

 

[Abomination]

But if we want to fund these agencies we will need to increase taxes and that is literally stealing /s

We can't afford to do that, we need to spend our tax dollars on the latest drone or fighter-bomber so we can drop explosives on brown people. Then mothball those purchases within 2 years and buy new ones.

 

[sneakypenguin]

@sneakypenguin, you forgot to mention in your thread questioning why more people aren?t pilots that the all the safety mechanisms on planes that make flight statistically safer than traditional ground travel are only provided on the LX models.

So MCAS right now is a bit of a bogeyman. The FAA certification rules are kind of dumb in that they don't really allow updating platforms(look at GA engines we are still using 1920s tech no electronic ignitions etc) so companies have to keep coming up with workarounds in order to keep the same type certificate.

MCAS was made to have the max retain the same handling characteristics of NGs and prior. In cases where the angle of attack starts getting too high it starts trimming the nose down ( and lessening control forces required to do so). Pretty standard and what you would want to happen. In this case the AOA was reading improperly and the MCAS started trimming the nose down.

Now it doesn't slam the nose down or anything it does it at a rate of about .25 degrees per second over 10 seconds. So nothing dramatic. It also doesn't activate if the flaps are out (take off or landing phases) doesn't activate if the autopilot is on, stops if the pilot uses trim, and stops if the cutout switches are hit. When working as intending a pilot would never notice it, when working improperly it manifest itself as a runaway trim scenario which is a memory item. (idk what it is on boeing but on my plane its quick disconnect button press and hold and sys 1-2 off) So I understand the thinking in not letting pilots know about it. After Lion air there wasn't a pilot out there who doesn't know about it so IDK why it was seemingly an issue with Ethiopian.

There is a lot of "safety" stuff that is optional. My airline doesn't use HUDs cause where we fly you might use it once per year, and it isn't worth the millions to maybe avoid a handful of planes from going to their alternate same thing with stuff like autoland or CAT3 capability, or ADSB. I don't view it as DLC for safety stuff.

I don't know that an AOA disagree light or another message on the EICAS would have helped these guys if they didn't notice everything else.

Boeing will issue a software update that will probably limit MCAS application to 10 seconds and disconnect whenever theres a AOA disagree. No worries on flying the max once its back online.

Not a boeing fan and you could assign the initial link in the accident chain to them but at some point the pilots failed. Lion air pilots maybe had an excuse these guys not so much. Boeing had already issued a bulletin for uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim that basically said heres exactly what it looks like and heres exactly what you do.( the normal memory item). http://www.avioesemusicas.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/TBC-19-Uncommanded-Nose-Down-Stab-Trim-Due-to-AOA.pdf


Boeing could have probably made a better system and it seems to be fixed with the software update but this latest one has to be on pilots primarily if it was really MCAS that caused this.

 

[stroopwafel]

Boeing could have probably made a better system and it seems to be fixed with the software update but this latest one has to be on pilots primarily if it was really MCAS that caused this.

I don't know if that is necessarily true. From what I understand the sensor in MCAS never worked as intended even in tests and they needed to put the jet engines closer to the fuselage to compensate for this and calculate a larger margin of error. That the pilots wrestled with controls when MCAS pushed the plane down so they kept flying at a dangerous altitude also isn't a good sign. I'd say the entire MCAS the way it was tested, overcompensated for and implemented leaves a lot to be desired. The argument that the pilots didn't receive specific intsructions on how to disengage MCAS because they 'should know about it' and that it only ever really works on autopilot is the crux of the problem: the plane crashed b/c the pilots were wrestling to take back it's controls. That is never good design even if the pilots lacked some crucial info on the specifics of the plane.

 

[The Lunatic]

So, you're telling me that DLC has literally killed people?

Fuck.

 

[sneakypenguin]

I don't know if that is necessarily true. From what I understand the sensor in MCAS never worked as intended even in tests and they needed to put the jet engines closer to the fuselage to compensate for this and calculate a larger margin of error. That the pilots wrestled with controls when MCAS pushed the plane down so they kept flying at a dangerous altitude also isn't a good sign. I'd say the entire MCAS the way it was tested, overcompensated for and implemented leaves a lot to be desired. The argument that the pilots didn't receive specific intsructions on how to disengage MCAS because they 'should know about it' and that it only ever really works on autopilot is the crux of the problem: the plane crashed b/c the pilots were wrestling to take back it's controls. That is never good design even if the pilots lacked some crucial info on the specifics of the plane.

MCAS doesn't work on auto pilot only when hand flying. The engines are mounted slightly forward of where they are on the non max's (for ground clearance) so to keep the feel the same they added MCAS (On underwing mounted planes theres a nose up moment whenever thrust is added)

I hate to defend boeing when I fly their competition but these pilots had all the info. The bulletin was released last year so it was in their FOM(flight ops manuel). The bulletin even says where to put it in the FOM. Even if they never heard of MCAS it manifest itself as stabilizer trim runaway which is a memory item. ( aircraft usually have 10-15 things that are memory/immediate action items pilots have to have memorized)

It shouldn't matter if the trim issue is caused by a motor continuously running due to mechanical issue or due to software commanding it. The procedure is the exact same.

So assuming Ethiopian was MCAS induced they took off positive rate gear up, then got to flap retraction altitude when the issue arose because MCAS doesn't work till flaps are up. They would have noticed an increase in required backpressure to maintain pitch. (should be automatic to then trim up cause we use trim constantly when hand flying this would also have the effect of shutting off MCAS temporarily) If they didn't do that there is trim indication on their EICAS (center screen with trim/gear/engine data), there is also mechanical trim wheels they would see moving. Apparently none of those things registered with either pilot and they didn't execute the memory item which would have had them hit the cutout switches.

Like I said Boeing has some blame coming imho because MCAS doesn't time out after the initial 10 seconds. But these pilots outside of willfull negligence knew about MCAS, knew the procedure to stop it but when the time came didn't do the memory item.

Perhaps experience played a role, the FO only had 200 hours total, a 73 FO in the US would have closer to 4000-7000 hours.(just the nature of airline industry here vs abroad) Combine a new FO and suddenly you have a young captain trying to handle an issue basically single pilot, gets overwhelmed and doesn't execute. IDK.


TLDR, no love for boeing but the pilots knew of MCAS and had 5 different things the could have done to deactivate it, had a memory item for it that would have solved it for good, had 3 maybe 4(depending on eicas messages) things they would have seen/felt that would indicate trim issue. For whatever reason never did the memory/iai for it.

 

[stroopwafel]

I don't know if that is necessarily true. From what I understand the sensor in MCAS never worked as intended even in tests and they needed to put the jet engines closer to the fuselage to compensate for this and calculate a larger margin of error. That the pilots wrestled with controls when MCAS pushed the plane down so they kept flying at a dangerous altitude also isn't a good sign. I'd say the entire MCAS the way it was tested, overcompensated for and implemented leaves a lot to be desired. The argument that the pilots didn't receive specific intsructions on how to disengage MCAS because they 'should know about it' and that it only ever really works on autopilot is the crux of the problem: the plane crashed b/c the pilots were wrestling to take back it's controls. That is never good design even if the pilots lacked some crucial info on the specifics of the plane.

MCAS doesn't work on auto pilot only when hand flying. The engines are mounted slightly forward of where they are on the non max's (for ground clearance) so to keep the feel the same they added MCAS (On underwing mounted planes theres a nose up moment whenever thrust is added)

I hate to defend boeing when I fly their competition but these pilots had all the info. The bulletin was released last year so it was in their FOM(flight ops manuel). The bulletin even says where to put it in the FOM. Even if they never heard of MCAS it manifest itself as stabilizer trim runaway which is a memory item. ( aircraft usually have 10-15 things that are memory/immediate action items pilots have to have memorized)

It shouldn't matter if the trim issue is caused by a motor continuously running due to mechanical issue or due to software commanding it. The procedure is the exact same.

So assuming Ethiopian was MCAS induced they took off positive rate gear up, then got to flap retraction altitude when the issue arose because MCAS doesn't work till flaps are up. They would have noticed an increase in required backpressure to maintain pitch. (should be automatic to then trim up cause we use trim constantly when hand flying this would also have the effect of shutting off MCAS temporarily) If they didn't do that there is trim indication on their EICAS (center screen with trim/gear/engine data), there is also mechanical trim wheels they would see moving. Apparently none of those things registered with either pilot and they didn't execute the memory item which would have had them hit the cutout switches.

Like I said Boeing has some blame coming imho because MCAS doesn't time out after the initial 10 seconds. But these pilots outside of willfull negligence knew about MCAS, knew the procedure to stop it but when the time came didn't do the memory item.

Perhaps experience played a role, the FO only had 200 hours total, a 73 FO in the US would have closer to 4000-7000 hours.(just the nature of airline industry here vs abroad) Combine a new FO and suddenly you have a young captain trying to handle an issue basically single pilot, gets overwhelmed and doesn't execute. IDK.


TLDR, no love for boeing but the pilots knew of MCAS and had 5 different things the could have done to deactivate it, had a memory item for it that would have solved it for good, had 3 maybe 4(depending on eicas messages) things they would have seen/felt that would indicate trim issue. For whatever reason never did the memory/iai for it.

Oh I see, thanks for explaining. Would it then be possible the accident happened b/c the pilots were simply unaware the trim issue was caused by MCAS and didn't have the memory item for stabilizer trim runaway? Maybe the pilots panicked being unable to maintain pitch and ignored trim indication on their EICAS or mechanical trim wheels trying to solve that issue first, specifically b/c it might have been an unfamiliar occurence having little to no experience with MCAS and lacking the specific memory item.

Still though, that two types of the same (new) plane crashes only months apart can't be a coincidence espescially considering some of the controversy with the FAA.

 

[Drathnoxis]

Wasn't privatizing air travel supposed to make it better

It did for what matters most.

Profit margins.

 

[Chimpzy_v1legacy]

I wonder what those extra optional safety features cost.

The cynic in me wants to know what price Boeing slapped on the lives of crew and passengers.

 

[Grouchy Imp_v1legacy]

Capitalism, f*ck yeah!

 

[Kwak]

which is a memory item.

Is that just pilot-speak for 'something they should have remembered'?

 

[Seanchaidh]

@sneakypenguin, you forgot to mention in your thread questioning why more people aren?t pilots that the all the safety mechanisms on planes that make flight statistically safer than traditional ground travel are only provided on the LX models.

So MCAS right now is a bit of a bogeyman. The FAA certification rules are kind of dumb in that they don't really allow updating platforms(look at GA engines we are still using 1920s tech no electronic ignitions etc) so companies have to keep coming up with workarounds in order to keep the same type certificate.

MCAS was made to have the max retain the same handling characteristics of NGs and prior. In cases where the angle of attack starts getting too high it starts trimming the nose down ( and lessening control forces required to do so). Pretty standard and what you would want to happen. In this case the AOA was reading improperly and the MCAS started trimming the nose down.

Now it doesn't slam the nose down or anything it does it at a rate of about .25 degrees per second over 10 seconds. So nothing dramatic. It also doesn't activate if the flaps are out (take off or landing phases) doesn't activate if the autopilot is on, stops if the pilot uses trim, and stops if the cutout switches are hit. When working as intending a pilot would never notice it, when working improperly it manifest itself as a runaway trim scenario which is a memory item. (idk what it is on boeing but on my plane its quick disconnect button press and hold and sys 1-2 off) So I understand the thinking in not letting pilots know about it. After Lion air there wasn't a pilot out there who doesn't know about it so IDK why it was seemingly an issue with Ethiopian.

So, this guy [https://medium.com/@jpaulreed/the-737max-and-why-software-engineers-should-pay-attention-a041290994bd] disagrees with some of that.

When this system detects a dangerous flight condition, it trims the aircraft, attempting to prevent a stall by pushing the nose down. Trim is not a fancy, new fangled technology: the Cessnas I fly have trim wheels, and autopilots manipulate trim to fly aircraft in an automated way. What is different here is: the MCAS commands the trim in this condition without notifying the pilots AND to override the input, the pilots must deactivate the system via a switch on a console, NOT by retrimming the aircraft via the yoke, which is a more common way to manage the airplane's trim.

Are you just assuming that overriding the trim by re-trimming is sufficient because it is in other cases, or are you specifically familiar with how MCAS works in this regard?

This is also an interesting point:

Also of note: the MCAS system directs the 737Max's stabilizer; this is part of the horizontal tail-fin on the 737, but it is located in the front; pilot input, however, affects the elevator, which is located on the opposite edge of the tail-fin. The important part here is: given continued input into the stabilizer, it's been reported that a pilot can be applying full opposite input into the stabilizer [pretty sure he means elevator here], and the physics are such that the stabilizer -- the part under control of the automatic system -- can override the inputs of the pilot.

Now, sure, there is a sequence of inputs you can use to solve all this. It still sounds like horrific design.