Projected seats by my assignation of general political position, with official blocs in brackets. 751 MEPs total, with pre-election MEPs in brackets.
Conservative (EPP): 180 (down from 221)
Eurosceptic / Nationalist-populist (ECR, ENF, EFDD): 171 (up from 118)
Left (S&D): 146 (down from 191)
Liberal (ALDE): 109 (up from 67)
Green/Progressive/Left (Green/EFA, GUE/NGL): 108 (up from 102)
Others: 37 (down from 52)
You might query how I've assigned some official blocs (for instance, the ECR could qualify as Conservative, and fudging together the Greens and progessive green/left/regionals) but I think it's reasonable enough.
General analysis:
This was perhaps not the massive breakthrough that European nationalists were hoping for, but still represents a big growth spurt and makes them a significant force. The other big beneficiaries from the decline of the mainstream left/right were the liberals, suggesting limited movement towards extremism.
Overall the general picture of left and right across the EU Parliament has little changed. The "right" generally is still equivalent to the centre & left, except that the right is now half comprised of nationalist-populists. If the UK departs, this pattern will basically remain.
* * *
In terms of the UK election, explicitly pro-remain parties beat the explicitly pro-Brexit parties in vote share (42.4% - 33.9%). Including estimated pro remain / leave in Conservatives and Labour, the vote was more pro-remain by about 5% (51.5-46.5). However, turnout was very low, well under 40%, so what this would augur for a potential new referendum is unclear.
The new "Brexit Party" was largest single party, although effectively all it did was cannibalise UKIP and strip some extra leave voters, mostly from the Conservatives. Meanwhile, Labour did not take such a big hammering as the Conservatives, but clearly a lot of its remain voters punished its prevarication by decamping to pro-remain parties.
Conservative (EPP): 180 (down from 221)
Eurosceptic / Nationalist-populist (ECR, ENF, EFDD): 171 (up from 118)
Left (S&D): 146 (down from 191)
Liberal (ALDE): 109 (up from 67)
Green/Progressive/Left (Green/EFA, GUE/NGL): 108 (up from 102)
Others: 37 (down from 52)
You might query how I've assigned some official blocs (for instance, the ECR could qualify as Conservative, and fudging together the Greens and progessive green/left/regionals) but I think it's reasonable enough.
If the UK leaves the EU in a few months, it will become (approximately):
Conservative (EPP): 180
Eurosceptic / Anti-EU / Nationalist (ECR, ENF, EFDD): 138
Left (S&D): 136
Liberal (ALDE): 93
Green/Progressive/Left (Green/EFA, GUE/NGL): 96
Others: 36
As a note, the UK Conservatives are ECR; Brexit Party is EFDD; Liberal Democrats are ALDE; Labour is S&D; SNP and Plaid Cymru are EFA; Greens are Green. I've guessed with the 3 Northern Irish parties as they haven't been officially returned yet - probably DUP (non-aligned), Sinn Fein (EFA), and one other.
Conservative (EPP): 180
Eurosceptic / Anti-EU / Nationalist (ECR, ENF, EFDD): 138
Left (S&D): 136
Liberal (ALDE): 93
Green/Progressive/Left (Green/EFA, GUE/NGL): 96
Others: 36
As a note, the UK Conservatives are ECR; Brexit Party is EFDD; Liberal Democrats are ALDE; Labour is S&D; SNP and Plaid Cymru are EFA; Greens are Green. I've guessed with the 3 Northern Irish parties as they haven't been officially returned yet - probably DUP (non-aligned), Sinn Fein (EFA), and one other.
General analysis:
This was perhaps not the massive breakthrough that European nationalists were hoping for, but still represents a big growth spurt and makes them a significant force. The other big beneficiaries from the decline of the mainstream left/right were the liberals, suggesting limited movement towards extremism.
Overall the general picture of left and right across the EU Parliament has little changed. The "right" generally is still equivalent to the centre & left, except that the right is now half comprised of nationalist-populists. If the UK departs, this pattern will basically remain.
* * *
In terms of the UK election, explicitly pro-remain parties beat the explicitly pro-Brexit parties in vote share (42.4% - 33.9%). Including estimated pro remain / leave in Conservatives and Labour, the vote was more pro-remain by about 5% (51.5-46.5). However, turnout was very low, well under 40%, so what this would augur for a potential new referendum is unclear.
The new "Brexit Party" was largest single party, although effectively all it did was cannibalise UKIP and strip some extra leave voters, mostly from the Conservatives. Meanwhile, Labour did not take such a big hammering as the Conservatives, but clearly a lot of its remain voters punished its prevarication by decamping to pro-remain parties.