4. INTRODUCTION: SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN (DRA) SIXTEEN MONTHS AGO, THE LEADERSHIP AND RANK AND FILE OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AFGHANISTAN (PDPA) -- THE KEY POLITICAL ELEMENT IN THE COUNTRY, WHOSE PRINCIPAL ROOTS LIE IN A SMALL GROUP IN THE MILITARY, A SEGMENT OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA, AND URBAN YOUTH -- HAVE BEEN TRYING TO ALTER DRASTICALLY AFGHANISTAN'S "TRADITIONAL" POLITICAL AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS. GIVEN AFGHANISTAN'S POVERTY AND BACKWARDNESS, THIS REVOLUTIONARY REGIME'S GOALS WOULD PROBABLY, IN THEMSELVES, DESERVE GENUINE SUPPORT FROM MOST QUARTERS INTERESTED IN BETTERING THE LOT OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. A SERIES OF POLITICAL MISTAKES, A POLICY OF BRUTAL REPRESSION, AND CERTAIN WIDESPREAD PERCEPTIONS (WHICH THE REGIME INSISTS ARE MISPERCEPTIONS), HOWEVER, HAVE CREATED AND FED A GROWING OPPOSITION MOVEMENT WHOSE INSURGENCY OPERATIONS HAVE NIBBLED AWAY AT THE GOVERNMENT'S CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE COUNTRY OUTSIDE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS -- ALTHOUGH THE REGIME CAN STILL RESPOND QUICKLY AND FORCEFULLY (AS DEMONSTRATED IN KABUL ON AUGUST 5) TO DIRECT CHALLENGES NEAR THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL HEART. NONETHELESS, THE OPPOSITION, ALBEIT STILL FRAGMENTED AND GENERALLY LEADERLESS, IS WIDESPREAD AND APPARENTLY FUELED BY DEEPLY-HELD GRIEVANCES THAT HAVE CAUSED THOUSANDS OF INSURGENTS TO RISK ALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW A REGIME WHICH PROFESSES THAT IT HAS ONLY THE WELFARE OF THE AFGHAN MASSES AT HEART.
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13. A GENUINE CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE DRA LEADERSHIP (NOT MERELY A COSMETIC RESHUFFLING OF PORTFOLIOS) MIGHT POSSIBLY HELP PRESERVE THE REVOLUTION, BUT A NEW DRA TEAM WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE TO CONVINCE THE AFGHAN POPULACE THAT "NEW APPROACHES" TO BOTH ISLAM AND MOSCOW WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. IN THIS CONNECTION, HOWEVER, THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP IS UNLIKELY TO OPT VOLUNTARILY FOR ITS OWN DESTRUCTION, REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT OR SOURCE OF OUTSIDE PRESSURE. AS A CONSEQUENCE -- IND IN THE ABSENCE OF INDIVIDUAL ASSASSINATIONS, A POSSIBILITY WHICH CANNOT BE RULED OUT -- THE KHALQI LEADERS WILL PROBABLY FORGE AHEAD WITH THEIR CURRENT EFFORTS TO STAMP OUT THE OPPOSITION BY FORCE, A POLICY WHICH WILL PROBABLY RESULT IN INCREASED FIGHTING IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, HIGHER LEVELS OF SOVIET SUPPORT, AND, EVENTUALLY, POSSIBLE DIRECT SOVIET INTERVENTION TO "SAVE THE REVOLUTION."
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16. CONVERSELY, THE AVAILABLE "MANIFESTOS" ISSUED BY SOME OPPOSITION GROUPS CALL FOR A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM BASED ON THE "FUNDAMENTALIST" TENETS OF ISLAM, AND, THEREFORE, AN OPPOSITION-LED REGIME WOULD PROBALY NOT HAVE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS (SO NECESSARY FOR THIS BACKWARD COUNTRY) HIGH ON ITS PRIORITY LIST. THOUSANDS OF PERSONAL VENDETTAS WOULD PROBABLY BE CARRIED OUT AGAINST SURVIVING KHALQI OFFICIALS, THEREBY PROBABLY TARNISHING A POST-DRA REGIME'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, NO MATTER HOW JUSTIFIED RETRIBUTION AGAINST SOME OFFICIALS MIGHT APPEAR TO BE. AN UNFRIENDLY STANCE TOWARD THE USSR (NOT INEVITABLE, BUT CERTAINLY MORE PROBABLE GIVEN THE FORCES MOTIVATING THE CURRENT OPPOSITION) COULD HAVE DESTABLIZING RESULTS FOR THE REGION, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE UNCERTAINTIES PREVAILING IN AFGHANISTAN'S NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THIS EVENTUALITY, INCIDENTALLY, COULD ENTER MOSCOW'S ASSESSMENT OF HOW FAR TO GO WITH THIS KHALQI REGIME.
17. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, OUR LARGER INTERESTS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE DRA'S EXTREMELY CLOSE TIES TO MOSCOW, THIS REGIME'S ALMOST OPEN HOSTILITY TO US, AND THE ATMOSPHERE OF FEAR IT HAS CREATED THROUGHOUT THIS COUNTRY, WOULD PROBABLY BE SERVED BY THE DEMISE OF THE TARAKI AND AMIN REGIME, DESPITE WHATEVER SETBACKS THIS MIGHT MEAN FOR FUTURE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS WITHIN AFGHANISTAN.