They knew about the serious issues with Comanche Peak in the 70's and managed to continuously cover it up until the mid 90's. When I posted on these forums a few years ago, the same man responsible for the NRC cover up, the same man who was bought off still held a senior position within the NRC. Go figure.
My Dad was involved with them much later, but it was still these problems being discussed here that were never properly repaired even then. They just kept lying, threatening and burying no matter who got hurt.
Sixty percent of the welds on pipes that would carry radioactive water were found to be defective, but the NRC said the system to detect errors was obviously working because the bad welds had been found. Then came a major mistake: TU built the concrete and steel supports for the reactor in Unit 2 out of alignment by 45 degrees. TU jack-hammered out the bad supports and rebuilt them in the right place. The NRC said the event did not indicate any major problems at the plant. Ellis was livid. It showed, she says, just how much attention to detail TU was paying as it built the new nuclear plant, and she contended that the same type thing might be happening all over the plant. But with the NRC supporting TU, the ASLB would not take Ellis?s concerns seriously, despite her growing pile of documentation.
WHILE ELLIS WAS DOCUMENTING THE PROBLEMS of Comanche Peak, the whole nuclear industry was being shaken by two unprecedented accidents that terrified the public and pressured the NRC to crack down on every plant in the nation. Comanche Peak was no exception. In 1975, at the Brown?s Ferry nuclear reactor in Alabama, an electrician using a candle flame to check for air leaks caught some electrical insulation on fire. The fire threatened the control of the reactor, and a meltdown was only narrowly avoided. The NRC responded by changing the design and construction regulations for all nuclear plants being built. One of the changes was to require two widely separated sets of electrical wires leading to the reactor control room, where before there had only been one, and to use better, less flammable insulation material. TU had to go back and redesign major portions of Comanche Peak.
Then came the worst nuclear disaster in the history of the country, and the nuclear industry was changed forever. On March 28, 1979, Pennsylvania?s Three Mile Island Unit 2 went out of control. A pressure relief valve on the reactor?s cooling system stuck open and most of the coolant leaked out. The control room indicator light for that valve showed that it was closed, which confused the operators. While they made a series of wrong decisions, such as turning off the flow of coolant, the reactor temperature soared to more than 5,000 degrees, and the core partially melted and fell to the bottom of the reactor vessel. The danger of radiation leaking into the environment lasted for weeks before the situation was brought under control. A small amount of gaseous radiation was released, and some 120,000 gallons of radioactive water escaped into the Susquehanna River. Nuclear engineers, perpetually optimistic, point to the Three Mile Island incident as proof of how well their hardware works. ?Three Mile Island,? says John Beck, vice president for nuclear engineering with TU, ?is a dramatic example of how that multiple layer of protection has actually worked.?
As construction proceeded at the plant, confusion mounted. A construction crew was dispatched to install a door in a wall that wasn?t there-but was shown on the current blueprints to have already been built. Or a crew would be ready to put up a pipe support-and find an electrical cable tray already occupying the spot. The construction crews would do the best they could, improvising on the spot to make things fit, constantly assured by management that this procedure was normal and that any problems would be caught by the iterative process. Another as-built would be drawn of what the crew had designed and built on the spot, and sent back to the engineers. At any one time it was difficult or impossible to know which part, if any, of the plant conformed to federal safety regulalions.
Most of the construction problems at Comanche Peak, taken singly, were relatively minor, but the sheer numbers were daunting. More than 85,000 reports of potential safety violations (a large portion of them, by the way. filed after TU said the plant was ready to start up in 1982) have been filed by TU and the NRC to date at the plant-so the overall cumulative problem is enormous. In places the plant doesn?t remotely resemble the original design. It has become difficult to determine whether all the pieces of the final plant will work together correctly and whether the plant will be safe. Incredibly, that confusion took about eight years to show, Then, in 1982, Juanita Ellis?s efforts finally paid off.
https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/1987/december/cloud-over-comanche-peak/IN THE SUMMER OF 1982 ELLIS GOT A call that changed everything. Mark Walsh, an engineer for TU. had quit his job in exasperation a few weeks earlier. He worked in the pipe-support group, which designed and checked the safety of brackets that held up the pipes that would carry coolant to the core. Walsh was convinced that the supports were unsafe, but none of his bosses seemed to care about his concerns. A couple of weeks after he left TU. he heard about Juanita Ellis.
My Dad was involved with them much later, but it was still these problems being discussed here that were never properly repaired even then. They just kept lying, threatening and burying no matter who got hurt.