OK, I'm so doing this... been thinking of starting such a thread for months now...
And yes, this is effectively an overglorifed 'vs' thread, so come at me!
Anyway: Hannibal vs Scipio?
No TLDR, but I've cut my piece up into... manageable chunks (it so could've been a hell of a lot longer, I'm so intellectually invested in this topic...). Feel free to criticise, I'll respond as best I can.
And yes, this is effectively an overglorifed 'vs' thread, so come at me!
Anyway: Hannibal vs Scipio?
No TLDR, but I've cut my piece up into... manageable chunks (it so could've been a hell of a lot longer, I'm so intellectually invested in this topic...). Feel free to criticise, I'll respond as best I can.
As a first point of comparison, this is rather unfair, but it is worth pointing out that comprehension of one?s enemies is a key step in the path to victory against them, whether in force of arms or otherwise. Of the two commanders, Scipio realised the resolve of the enemy city more quickly, though this may be unfair, because Carthage, as an economic power, relied on mercenaries over a citizen army. However, both cities were guilty of neglect against their premier commanders in the field. Hannibal was afforded a sum total of zero reinforcements from the Carthaginian Senate, and while Scipio was not so disparagingly treated, he was given command of defeated and dispirited soldiers. Yet both men did well with what they had.
Thus, it is less a case of which city was ?better? per se, and more which one was more obstinate...
Thus, it is less a case of which city was ?better? per se, and more which one was more obstinate...
Both men were noted for their charisma, which may be a rather obvious observation, but their qualities as leaders of men are rather different.
However, like Alexander, Hannibal inherited a great deal, namely the system and the army created by his father, Hamilcar. But, in any case it would?ve been difficult to command such an army as he had in Italy, so diverse as it was: Libyans; Numidians; Iberians of various tribes; Gauls of various tribe; Italians of various tribes; and his own cadre of Carthaginian officers. To say that it was prodigious of him to lead this motley band for sixteen years is awesome, especially since he is recorded as only understanding Punic and Greek.
On the other hand, Scipio inherited nothing but his father?s name and scepticism and was given command of not one, but two separate armies of generally war-weary and battered legions. His father and uncle died at Castulo and Ilorca, leaving the Roman presence at just two under-strength legions, reinforced by another ragtag bunch of soldiers (many of whom were the beaten survivors of Trebbia) when Scipio landed in Tarraco. And then, when given leave to prepare the invasion of Africa, Scipio was given an even more wretched force: the survivors of Cannae! And yet in each case, he turned both into strong and professional armies that remained unbeaten while he commanded. Only Sucro puts his qualities into question, and yet he dispelled the trouble before it came to a head, and it is difficult to justify how he can be faulted with it in the first place.
However, like Alexander, Hannibal inherited a great deal, namely the system and the army created by his father, Hamilcar. But, in any case it would?ve been difficult to command such an army as he had in Italy, so diverse as it was: Libyans; Numidians; Iberians of various tribes; Gauls of various tribe; Italians of various tribes; and his own cadre of Carthaginian officers. To say that it was prodigious of him to lead this motley band for sixteen years is awesome, especially since he is recorded as only understanding Punic and Greek.
On the other hand, Scipio inherited nothing but his father?s name and scepticism and was given command of not one, but two separate armies of generally war-weary and battered legions. His father and uncle died at Castulo and Ilorca, leaving the Roman presence at just two under-strength legions, reinforced by another ragtag bunch of soldiers (many of whom were the beaten survivors of Trebbia) when Scipio landed in Tarraco. And then, when given leave to prepare the invasion of Africa, Scipio was given an even more wretched force: the survivors of Cannae! And yet in each case, he turned both into strong and professional armies that remained unbeaten while he commanded. Only Sucro puts his qualities into question, and yet he dispelled the trouble before it came to a head, and it is difficult to justify how he can be faulted with it in the first place.
I don?t think I?ll sport with anyone?s intelligence here, because it is clear that Hannibal was the superior tactician in the war as his record attests. He cannot be challenged in the variation, quantity and quality of the tactics, tricks, ruses and stratagems that he used throughout the war. Ambuscades, encirclement, distraction and absolute use of geography prove him to be far above all to have come before (and I add Alexander to this list) and after, in all likelihood. I belittle Alexander not for the impression that his victories give, but the quality of the opposition. There were no multinational, disorganised or reluctant mobs that he faced in Italy, whose numerical superiority was undone by any lack of discipline. No, all were the rising legion with a common language and lead by men who were often career soldiers, not kings or emperors who lead by virtue of their position. This in itself earns Hannibal greater credit.
As for Scipio, if Hannibal were the consummate teacher, then Scipio was the consummate student, and the best one Hannibal had. But he was not so inflexible as to merely copy, he adapted and I?d even suggest that he improved them, most notably at Ilipa, a prime example of pro-active manoeuvre against a superior enemy. Though the quality of such tactics can be offset by Hannibal?s ability to read Varro?s character at Cannae. Still, Scipio had no small skill at assessing the mind of his enemies. But if there is one respect in which Scipio can be considered tactically superior, it is siege-craft, illustrated eminently by the storm of Carthago Nova. All of Hannibal?s sieges (or attempted sieges) were conventional or achieved by ?treachery? (a word I use somewhat lightly, here).
As for Scipio, if Hannibal were the consummate teacher, then Scipio was the consummate student, and the best one Hannibal had. But he was not so inflexible as to merely copy, he adapted and I?d even suggest that he improved them, most notably at Ilipa, a prime example of pro-active manoeuvre against a superior enemy. Though the quality of such tactics can be offset by Hannibal?s ability to read Varro?s character at Cannae. Still, Scipio had no small skill at assessing the mind of his enemies. But if there is one respect in which Scipio can be considered tactically superior, it is siege-craft, illustrated eminently by the storm of Carthago Nova. All of Hannibal?s sieges (or attempted sieges) were conventional or achieved by ?treachery? (a word I use somewhat lightly, here).
Regardless of how I compare their respective campaigns, I must give this to Scipio. Hannibal in Italy ? after Cannae, his activities were confined to southern Italy where he continued to obtain tactical victory after tactical victory, which did little except slowly erode his army, which was already small as it was (I refer of course to the core of Africans that he left Iberia with). Early in the war, every strategic move he made was a response to Roman movement. During the Fabian period, he had the initiative, but was well stifled, and was rendered incapable of making any incisive move against Rome. After Cannae, he failed to perform a strategic follow up, which remains one of the more confusing of his decisions, though the reasoning has already been alluded to.
Contrasting this against Scipio in Iberia, his initial army was less than half the size of Hannibal?s when he entered Cisalpine Gaul. His total forces never numbered more than fifty-thousand during his campaign here (or at all during the entire war). But the key difference was his use of his ?meagre? resources (a fact of which mirrored Hannibal?s own circumstances in the Roman hinterland). Each strike had motive, method and purpose and was followed up both morally and strategically, such that exploitation of each victory was total. Most criticism is levelled at his lack of pursuit after Baecula, but to assess it fairly, he was in the far south of Iberia, with almost three times his number of enemy soldiers within a couple days? forced march of his position, his lines of communication were tenuous so far from Carthago Nova and his northern Iberian allies, and it forced Hasdrubal (whose army, while not destroyed, was much diminished) to spend most of 207 recruiting among the Transalpine Gauls, giving Rome time enough to respond, even if it took some skill by Nero to carry it through. But regardless of one?s assessment of Baecula, each and every of Scipio?s tactical victories had strategic ramifications. The same cannot be said of Hannibal, whose later victories after 216 had little effect on the prosecution of the war, and after 210 or thereabouts, they had virtually no effect whatsoever.
Contrasting this against Scipio in Iberia, his initial army was less than half the size of Hannibal?s when he entered Cisalpine Gaul. His total forces never numbered more than fifty-thousand during his campaign here (or at all during the entire war). But the key difference was his use of his ?meagre? resources (a fact of which mirrored Hannibal?s own circumstances in the Roman hinterland). Each strike had motive, method and purpose and was followed up both morally and strategically, such that exploitation of each victory was total. Most criticism is levelled at his lack of pursuit after Baecula, but to assess it fairly, he was in the far south of Iberia, with almost three times his number of enemy soldiers within a couple days? forced march of his position, his lines of communication were tenuous so far from Carthago Nova and his northern Iberian allies, and it forced Hasdrubal (whose army, while not destroyed, was much diminished) to spend most of 207 recruiting among the Transalpine Gauls, giving Rome time enough to respond, even if it took some skill by Nero to carry it through. But regardless of one?s assessment of Baecula, each and every of Scipio?s tactical victories had strategic ramifications. The same cannot be said of Hannibal, whose later victories after 216 had little effect on the prosecution of the war, and after 210 or thereabouts, they had virtually no effect whatsoever.
This is another area of comparison that is very difficult to assess. On the one hand, Hannibal asked nothing that he would not do himself, while Scipio delegated tactical and operational commands to his subordinates, trusting them to carry out his will, which they did. Therefore, it is merely a case of deciding which form of generalship is superior. While both have their merits, Hannibal?s individual skill (for that is what it was: individual) allowed his army no room for errors, and had he fallen at any stage, it is difficult to say if anyone could take his place in holding his army together, let alone emulating his victories. However, he was one of the first generals to embrace the staff structure of the modern army, and it was with this system of delegating individual responsibilities of the army to trusted colleagues (including his younger brother Mago, a man called Hasdrubal who was his quartermaster general, and the Numidian Maharbal who commanded the African cavalry) that he coordinated so magnificent a catalogue of battlefield wins.
Even Scipio copied this, but unlike Hannibal, who commanded each and every engagement, kept his attention fixed purely on the grand strategic goals he had in mind. In Iberia, the prize was Gades, so when an army under Mago and Hanno appears around Numantia, instead of heading it off himself, he detaches Silanus to deal with it while he plans what would eventually be the campaign season culminating in Ilipa. Similarly, upon his invasion of Africa, he sends Laelius and Masinissa to finish Syphax off while he keeps his eye on Carthage.
It is therefore little surprise that in 202, leading into Zama, that Hannibal is now mentally exhausted and a decidedly cynical man, both in his attitude towards Rome, but also his own home city, while Scipio is just as cynical, but fresher of mind. Instead of concerning himself with everything, he leaves decidedly pettier affairs to his lieutenants.
Even Scipio copied this, but unlike Hannibal, who commanded each and every engagement, kept his attention fixed purely on the grand strategic goals he had in mind. In Iberia, the prize was Gades, so when an army under Mago and Hanno appears around Numantia, instead of heading it off himself, he detaches Silanus to deal with it while he plans what would eventually be the campaign season culminating in Ilipa. Similarly, upon his invasion of Africa, he sends Laelius and Masinissa to finish Syphax off while he keeps his eye on Carthage.
It is therefore little surprise that in 202, leading into Zama, that Hannibal is now mentally exhausted and a decidedly cynical man, both in his attitude towards Rome, but also his own home city, while Scipio is just as cynical, but fresher of mind. Instead of concerning himself with everything, he leaves decidedly pettier affairs to his lieutenants.
And yet again, this is a difficult point of comparison as it raises a contentious point of what a good commander of soldiers should or should not be. With regard to statesmanship, Scipio deserves the greater accolade, for a number of reasons. I will disregard public popularity as that is neither here nor there.
Instead, to consider diplomatic action, let us observe the alliances they crafted. In Iberia, Scipio made allies from the Iberian tribes and kingdoms virtually without exception by use of clemency towards the Iberians in general and generosity towards the nobles. After Ilipa, a rebellion started that he succeeded in quelling, but he continued to be lenient, but when Andobales scorned this, Scipio turned from being the ?staff? of guidance, to the ?staff? of punishment. Hannibal, on the other hand, formed all of Magna Graecia and the southern Italics into an alliance, but he was unable to draw any real fighting strength from any of them, yet early Republican Roman history is littered with the struggles they had with the Samnites, Bruttians and Tarentines. But where were then during the later stages of the Second Punic War. They were conspicuous by their absence in any real quantity. Only in Macedon and Philip V did he have any military support, but apart from a token few columns of mercenaries, he contributed little except moral support.
Conversely, Scipio succeeded in tempting first Syphax (initiated by Laelius and almost carried through by weight of name alone) and then Masinissa to the Roman cause, the latter no doubt helped by the rescue and return of the young Massiva, the prince?s nephew. All?s fair in war, and charges of ?betrayal? levelled at Masinissa are far from justified (Gisco had just given the Massylian prince?s bride-to-be to Syphax, who then usurped his crown and exiled him, so it is only natural that he would throw his lot in with Rome).
Instead, to consider diplomatic action, let us observe the alliances they crafted. In Iberia, Scipio made allies from the Iberian tribes and kingdoms virtually without exception by use of clemency towards the Iberians in general and generosity towards the nobles. After Ilipa, a rebellion started that he succeeded in quelling, but he continued to be lenient, but when Andobales scorned this, Scipio turned from being the ?staff? of guidance, to the ?staff? of punishment. Hannibal, on the other hand, formed all of Magna Graecia and the southern Italics into an alliance, but he was unable to draw any real fighting strength from any of them, yet early Republican Roman history is littered with the struggles they had with the Samnites, Bruttians and Tarentines. But where were then during the later stages of the Second Punic War. They were conspicuous by their absence in any real quantity. Only in Macedon and Philip V did he have any military support, but apart from a token few columns of mercenaries, he contributed little except moral support.
Conversely, Scipio succeeded in tempting first Syphax (initiated by Laelius and almost carried through by weight of name alone) and then Masinissa to the Roman cause, the latter no doubt helped by the rescue and return of the young Massiva, the prince?s nephew. All?s fair in war, and charges of ?betrayal? levelled at Masinissa are far from justified (Gisco had just given the Massylian prince?s bride-to-be to Syphax, who then usurped his crown and exiled him, so it is only natural that he would throw his lot in with Rome).
I contend that while Scipio and Hannibal were primarily each other?s advseraries on the battlefield (as far as contemporary national heroes are concerned), they both considered Fabius (or rather, Fabius and his ilk) to be a greater hindrance on their war efforts than each other. And in both cases, it is the Fabian strategy that delays the implementation of their well-worked designs. However, in this case, like so many others, it is difficult to say who overcame the obstacle better, whether in the ease (or rather, difficulty) or the elegance with which it was done.
With Hannibal, it is on the field, and his tactical intricacies and delightful stratagems were no less the case when dealing with Fabius than it was dealing with the inordinate attention of the long succession of Roman consuls who came marching and left running. Ager Falernus is the pinnacle of this, and his ability to read, measure and assess his enemies (and their character) is well illustrated here, baiting Fabius with what was clearly a ?trick?, yet knowing that his enemy would do precisely what he wanted, that is to say, nothing. Thus, he was able to move army and camp under cover ot night towards Apulia. No mean feat for a column of over fifty thousand, not to mention horses, cattle and other beats of burden, as well as the recovery of the ?bait? detachment, all of which came at little cost (material and otherwise) to him, and indeed he simultaneously gave Fabius a bloody nose.
As for Scipio, his battle with Fabius was political, carried out within the Forum with words and rhetoric. Now, Fabius came from a family with a long line of successful consuls and being of an age that ?suited? the patrician senators, his words curried more favour purely from his age and lineage, as opposed to any personal qualities he may have had (though I will admit that he was an honourable man who sought to serve Rome as best he could, outlaying a fair proportion of his own personal fortune during the war). However, at this point in time, Hannibal was surrounded in Magna Graecia (albeit thinly), and much of the senate, Fabius in particular persisted in keeping their distance and promoting caution. But time had moved, the raw levies were blooded and many Roman commanders had developed the skills to succeed against the Carthaginians and the Barcas (if not necessarily Hannibal himself). See Claudius Nero, a name so associated with the capricious emperor of the first century, but the man who debatably won the Second Punic War for Rome is so easily forgotten, especially when one factors in his duping of Hannibal two days before the battle. Or Torquatus, whose victory at Caralis was less decisive strategically, but no less important in robbing Hannibal of reinforcements. I digress.
With the question of whether to take the fight to Carthage, Scipio was faced with many an argument and many an enemy within Rome (most notably Cato, Fabius? protege). They questioned his conduct at every turn, including the fiasco of Locris, which may be a mark against Scipio and worthy of expansion (though I view it as an accusation borne more from envy than anything else), but not for this comparison. And then there was the commission sent to Sicily to investigate his alleged excesses, but the tribunes returned with nothing but praise for the consul. And this commission is perhaps the most hypocritical moves taken in Roman history: the Senate first reluctantly gives him leave to plan his invasion, but gives him next to nothing to invade with (and indeed did not allow him to raise an appropriate consular army); but within months demanded to see something of worth from his initial ventures. By this time, he had a thoroughly professional army of two legions (the survivors of Cannae supplemented by volunteers and some of the Iberian veterans) and a fleet of forty quadriremes and quinqueremes commissioned at his own expense. To overcome Fabius? objections (most of which relate to keeping Hannibal occupied, the inherent risk of campaigning on foreign soil and defending Rome directly), Scipio looked to his successes in Iberia, the weariness of the Roman people, the cost of the war both to the land and those that tended it, the potential prize of realised imperial aspirations and above all, the effect of enemy soldiers upon home soil. Too long had Hannibal done as he wished within Italy and this had an undoubted effect on Rome?s citizens, regardless of class. It was high time that such treatment was visited upon Carthage. Let the lesson be well learned by Rome, but let the punishment she delivers be final. To this, there could be no denial.
Thus, the ways in which each man dealt with Fabius was skilful, but in ways so different from each other. But if superiority must be afforded, then it is to Scipio, who displayed ability in politics, where the tactical genius of Hannibal was what we have come to expect of him after Trebbia and Trasimene, and victories to the extent that he has no reason to prove himself in this way, while Scipio, with a loss of military autonomy marked by the end of his pro-consulship in Iberia, required a different set of wile to forward his strategic ends. Not bad for a man of barely thirty.
With Hannibal, it is on the field, and his tactical intricacies and delightful stratagems were no less the case when dealing with Fabius than it was dealing with the inordinate attention of the long succession of Roman consuls who came marching and left running. Ager Falernus is the pinnacle of this, and his ability to read, measure and assess his enemies (and their character) is well illustrated here, baiting Fabius with what was clearly a ?trick?, yet knowing that his enemy would do precisely what he wanted, that is to say, nothing. Thus, he was able to move army and camp under cover ot night towards Apulia. No mean feat for a column of over fifty thousand, not to mention horses, cattle and other beats of burden, as well as the recovery of the ?bait? detachment, all of which came at little cost (material and otherwise) to him, and indeed he simultaneously gave Fabius a bloody nose.
As for Scipio, his battle with Fabius was political, carried out within the Forum with words and rhetoric. Now, Fabius came from a family with a long line of successful consuls and being of an age that ?suited? the patrician senators, his words curried more favour purely from his age and lineage, as opposed to any personal qualities he may have had (though I will admit that he was an honourable man who sought to serve Rome as best he could, outlaying a fair proportion of his own personal fortune during the war). However, at this point in time, Hannibal was surrounded in Magna Graecia (albeit thinly), and much of the senate, Fabius in particular persisted in keeping their distance and promoting caution. But time had moved, the raw levies were blooded and many Roman commanders had developed the skills to succeed against the Carthaginians and the Barcas (if not necessarily Hannibal himself). See Claudius Nero, a name so associated with the capricious emperor of the first century, but the man who debatably won the Second Punic War for Rome is so easily forgotten, especially when one factors in his duping of Hannibal two days before the battle. Or Torquatus, whose victory at Caralis was less decisive strategically, but no less important in robbing Hannibal of reinforcements. I digress.
With the question of whether to take the fight to Carthage, Scipio was faced with many an argument and many an enemy within Rome (most notably Cato, Fabius? protege). They questioned his conduct at every turn, including the fiasco of Locris, which may be a mark against Scipio and worthy of expansion (though I view it as an accusation borne more from envy than anything else), but not for this comparison. And then there was the commission sent to Sicily to investigate his alleged excesses, but the tribunes returned with nothing but praise for the consul. And this commission is perhaps the most hypocritical moves taken in Roman history: the Senate first reluctantly gives him leave to plan his invasion, but gives him next to nothing to invade with (and indeed did not allow him to raise an appropriate consular army); but within months demanded to see something of worth from his initial ventures. By this time, he had a thoroughly professional army of two legions (the survivors of Cannae supplemented by volunteers and some of the Iberian veterans) and a fleet of forty quadriremes and quinqueremes commissioned at his own expense. To overcome Fabius? objections (most of which relate to keeping Hannibal occupied, the inherent risk of campaigning on foreign soil and defending Rome directly), Scipio looked to his successes in Iberia, the weariness of the Roman people, the cost of the war both to the land and those that tended it, the potential prize of realised imperial aspirations and above all, the effect of enemy soldiers upon home soil. Too long had Hannibal done as he wished within Italy and this had an undoubted effect on Rome?s citizens, regardless of class. It was high time that such treatment was visited upon Carthage. Let the lesson be well learned by Rome, but let the punishment she delivers be final. To this, there could be no denial.
Thus, the ways in which each man dealt with Fabius was skilful, but in ways so different from each other. But if superiority must be afforded, then it is to Scipio, who displayed ability in politics, where the tactical genius of Hannibal was what we have come to expect of him after Trebbia and Trasimene, and victories to the extent that he has no reason to prove himself in this way, while Scipio, with a loss of military autonomy marked by the end of his pro-consulship in Iberia, required a different set of wile to forward his strategic ends. Not bad for a man of barely thirty.
Here, I will skirt over the battle, as for my current thoughts, the result is not of any consequence. Instead, I look to the conduct of each commander and they conduct during the battle. Zama is so rare a battle where each army and each commander gave good account of their actions and decisions and no mistake or fault of tactics can be identified. Each man gave his all in this battle with the resources at his disposal. Hannibal used elephants as best they could be used, in the line of battle to shock, awe, disrupt and intimidate, but the threat was countered by Scipio?s dispositions, traps and clever use of skirmishers. Hannibal sought to nullify the inferiority in his cavalry arm and succeeded, leading Laelius and Masinissa away from the battle long enough that Scipio?s position with the infantry could be counted as almost untenable during the latter stages. And likewise, Scipio did the same with his infantry. Upon engagement of the first and second lines of each army, Scipio withdraws his entire line and bought time for his cavalry to return when he completely changed his dispositions and held them back to refresh themselves for the coming clash. Were the armies to be reversed in composition, be in no doubt that Hannibal would?ve won, and in precisely the same manner in which he lost in reality.
No, I consider, not the battle, but the campaign prior to the battle to be a better illustration of each man?s skills. First, moral, both on the Carthaginian people, and upon his own army. Scipio had defeated each army sent against him and only Hannibal?s remained. But with the violation of his peace terms, he pillaged the land, not only to supply his weakened army (losses incurred, though probably close to negligible, though a legion was still with Masinissa in and around Kirtha, and the loss of several weeks? worth of supplies destined for his army stripped bare by the Carthaginian citizenry). Hannibal, though, landed with twenty-four thousand of his Italian veterans, marched north and were doubtless not in want of resupply. And he was furnished with mercenaries and an African levy, while Scipio?s army was still divided, smaller and without a route of escape, far inland as it was. Knowing that the Carthaginian people would want immediate action taken, Scipio knew that Hannibal would be after him soon, so he marched west, which served to draw Hannibal from his economic and military base, Carthage, Scipio towards his, the Massylian capital, and vitally, his much needed reinforcements. And when he discovers Carthaginian scouts in his camp, he insolently shows them his strength, reading Hannibal?s reaction, a mixture of surprise and amusement at this display of supposed arrogance which prompted him to request an embassy. And the third incidence of Scipio?s skill was to buy more time and allow his army a superior preparation for battle. He marched his army to an isolated hill close to water, and Hannibal, to maintain contact and a presence of threat had to encamp on a distant hill that was far from a source of water, the same source of water that Scipio?s army used. Thus, Hannibal?s foragers were prone to attack, leaving his army close to dehydrated when battle loomed, by which time, Masinissa had arrived with much needed reinforcements. Each move served to negate Hannibal?s numerical superiority.
No, I consider, not the battle, but the campaign prior to the battle to be a better illustration of each man?s skills. First, moral, both on the Carthaginian people, and upon his own army. Scipio had defeated each army sent against him and only Hannibal?s remained. But with the violation of his peace terms, he pillaged the land, not only to supply his weakened army (losses incurred, though probably close to negligible, though a legion was still with Masinissa in and around Kirtha, and the loss of several weeks? worth of supplies destined for his army stripped bare by the Carthaginian citizenry). Hannibal, though, landed with twenty-four thousand of his Italian veterans, marched north and were doubtless not in want of resupply. And he was furnished with mercenaries and an African levy, while Scipio?s army was still divided, smaller and without a route of escape, far inland as it was. Knowing that the Carthaginian people would want immediate action taken, Scipio knew that Hannibal would be after him soon, so he marched west, which served to draw Hannibal from his economic and military base, Carthage, Scipio towards his, the Massylian capital, and vitally, his much needed reinforcements. And when he discovers Carthaginian scouts in his camp, he insolently shows them his strength, reading Hannibal?s reaction, a mixture of surprise and amusement at this display of supposed arrogance which prompted him to request an embassy. And the third incidence of Scipio?s skill was to buy more time and allow his army a superior preparation for battle. He marched his army to an isolated hill close to water, and Hannibal, to maintain contact and a presence of threat had to encamp on a distant hill that was far from a source of water, the same source of water that Scipio?s army used. Thus, Hannibal?s foragers were prone to attack, leaving his army close to dehydrated when battle loomed, by which time, Masinissa had arrived with much needed reinforcements. Each move served to negate Hannibal?s numerical superiority.
It is a pity that precious little is known about Hannibal as a man, though Laelius, via Polybius, gives us a fair detail of Scipio?s demeanour.
However, I will say that Hannibal was an honourable man, who, while hating Rome as a state and institution, respected his enemies, giving Paullus a funeral pyre and searching the blood-soaked shore of Trasimene for Flaminius? body. But his character was shown in his conduct after Zama, which demonstrated a certain dignity when he ejected a belligerent senator from session, reminding them (bordering on humiliating) of all the services he had rendered onto his country.
For Scipio, much of his character, I have already alluded to above, but I consider it a certain greatness of character in his ability to discern when to use moderation and severity in dealing with defeated foes. Severity against his erstwhile Iberian allies who rebelled, demanding more than he could give, or outright refusing any gratitude that may have come from mutual help, which served to quell the dissenters, intimidate potential dissenters and reward his loyal allies with cheap territorial expansion for their demesnes. But the tribes of Iberia were small and petty enough that any conflict they indulged in would be of little trouble to Rome upon their subjugation (with the possible exception of Cantabria). But Carthage was a different prospect, the most powerful state in western Africa, and still a threat even when defeated. Thus, how to treat them so as not to make an enemy of them, that is to say, how to end a war with a good peace: remove their military threat; but moderation in financial punishment. Herein, no seeds of future resentment were sown, but the immoderate Senate of Rome saw to their ruination.
However, I will say that Hannibal was an honourable man, who, while hating Rome as a state and institution, respected his enemies, giving Paullus a funeral pyre and searching the blood-soaked shore of Trasimene for Flaminius? body. But his character was shown in his conduct after Zama, which demonstrated a certain dignity when he ejected a belligerent senator from session, reminding them (bordering on humiliating) of all the services he had rendered onto his country.
For Scipio, much of his character, I have already alluded to above, but I consider it a certain greatness of character in his ability to discern when to use moderation and severity in dealing with defeated foes. Severity against his erstwhile Iberian allies who rebelled, demanding more than he could give, or outright refusing any gratitude that may have come from mutual help, which served to quell the dissenters, intimidate potential dissenters and reward his loyal allies with cheap territorial expansion for their demesnes. But the tribes of Iberia were small and petty enough that any conflict they indulged in would be of little trouble to Rome upon their subjugation (with the possible exception of Cantabria). But Carthage was a different prospect, the most powerful state in western Africa, and still a threat even when defeated. Thus, how to treat them so as not to make an enemy of them, that is to say, how to end a war with a good peace: remove their military threat; but moderation in financial punishment. Herein, no seeds of future resentment were sown, but the immoderate Senate of Rome saw to their ruination.
Um... any takers?! Asia Minor? No?
