Funny events in anti-woke world

Recommended Videos

XsjadoBlayde

~ just another dread messenger & artisanal kunt ~
Apr 29, 2020
3,900
3,994
118
not sure what party they from, might have missed it if it was said, but ultimately stealing from your mum while gaslighting her through age difference is undoubtedly not woke behaviour, in the original intended use of the word
 
  • Like
Reactions: BrawlMan

Casual Shinji

Should've gone before we left.
Legacy
Jul 18, 2009
21,017
5,909
118
Youtube keeps recommending me vtubers reacting to ShoeonHead. This was a thing a couple of months ago (and then a couple of months before that) and I guess they're making another push again. Trying to launder right-wing grfiting through anime girls seems to be getting very popular these days, and you'd think some of these vtubers (who hopefully aren't bigoted pieces of shit) would maybe speak up about this and actively distance themselves from the nazis.
 
  • Like
Reactions: BrawlMan

Seanchaidh

Elite Member
Legacy
Mar 21, 2009
6,534
3,914
118
Country
United States of America

If expelling Evo Morales from the party causes it to basically collapse, that lends a lot of weight to the reasoning behind the Bolivian Supreme Court's decision to allow Evo Morales to abolish term limits based on the right of the people to decide they want Evo Morales again to be their leader; if spoiled and blank ballots are the plurality winner or even the majority, in what sense has 'democracy' been served?
 

BrawlMan

Lover of beat'em ups.
Legacy
Mar 10, 2016
34,968
14,322
118
Detroit, Michigan
Country
United States of America
Gender
Male
Trying to launder right-wing grfiting through anime girls seems to be getting very popular these days, and you'd think some of these vtubers (who hopefully aren't bigoted pieces of shit) would maybe speak up about this and actively distance themselves from the nazis.
Or sometimes dudes posing as anime girls, but it's clear by their voice that they are men. I haven't seen any of these recommendations yet, but the vtubers I've seen so far want nothing to do with the far right. Two of the ones I know are bisexual women. They're not a fan of the far right bitches.
 
Last edited:

Phoenixmgs

The Muse of Fate
Legacy
Apr 3, 2020
11,089
930
118
w/ M'Kraan Crystal
Gender
Male
The vaccines we're talking about are mRNA. They are not live attenuated vaccines. They contain no viruses whatsoever.



Lazy, loose stats, as we've come to expect.

I love how you're happy to overlook or ignore ~5% of the population for the sake of this, but you also want us to build policy around 0.0005%.



"Why wouldn't that percentage extend to everyone else"? What are you even talking about? We're specifically talking about the people who received that specific vaccine. Within that group we know, roughly, the incidence.

Same as we roughly know the incidence of arrhythmia in the group of severe covid sufferers, and by extention of covid sufferers broadly.

Those are the groups we're comparing.



Uh-huh, and I addressed this. Immunity wanes. Including for severe infection. The risk is lower but remains extant. Vaccines lower it further.
I already covered that...
Vaccines replicate an infection whether giving a lot less potent version of the virus/bacteria or the mRNA vaccines that just give you the spike protein of the virus. The former is still an infection and the latter may or may not be based on semantics. Regardless, it's recreating in your body the same (very similar) immune response as actually getting the infection, and that immune response is the cause of inflammation.

My stat is way more accurate than what you are trying to do with your stat. Your stat is that 2% of those in that group (IIRC, adolescents) that got severe covid got arrhythmia, that is not the chance of getting arrhythmia for a random adolescent. You keep comparing apples to oranges and saying BS that it's 40x more likely, it's not and not even close to that. You haven't even provided the chance of someone in that group getting severe covid, you need that number.

Severe infection immunity does not wane for those not vulnerable. IIRC, it doesn't even wane for healthy elderly people.


The J and J one was pulled because it was more likely to cause myocarditis. The other ones didnt
No, the J&J had the issue with blood clots in women. I got that one because it was just one shot and it was safest for men.
 

Silvanus

Elite Member
Legacy
Jan 15, 2013
14,049
7,270
118
Country
United Kingdom
I already covered that...
Yes, incorrectly. There is no "may or may not". It's not an infection.

My stat is way more accurate than what you are trying to do with your stat. Your stat is that 2% of those in that group (IIRC, adolescents) that got severe covid got arrhythmia, that is not the chance of getting arrhythmia for a random adolescent.
? Why would we want the chance of a random adolescent getting it? We're comparing the relative dangers of covid and the vaccine, not the danger of arrhythmia in the population at large.

You keep comparing apples to oranges and saying BS that it's 40x more likely, it's not and not even close to that.
And yet, even if we take your number, we still end up with a risk far, far, far, far lower than 0.0005%.

Severe infection immunity does not wane for those not vulnerable. IIRC, it doesn't even wane for healthy elderly people.
Yes, it does. This is not disputed.

But even if we're talking about mild infection... you know that myocarditis from the vaccine is also mild and self-limiting. So if you think we should ignore negative effects that are relatively mild, you're on shaky ground yourself.
 

crimson5pheonix

It took 6 months to read my title.
Legacy
Jun 6, 2008
36,822
4,055
118

If expelling Evo Morales from the party causes it to basically collapse, that lends a lot of weight to the reasoning behind the Bolivian Supreme Court's decision to allow Evo Morales to abolish term limits based on the right of the people to decide they want Evo Morales again to be their leader; if spoiled and blank ballots are the plurality winner or even the majority, in what sense has 'democracy' been served?
They put that question to a vote and the Bolivian people voted against amending the term limits. That was the whole basis behind the right taking down Morales in the first place. They were wrong for doing it, but this is clearly a case of Morales having sour grapes and blowing everything up.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Mister Mumbler

Silvanus

Elite Member
Legacy
Jan 15, 2013
14,049
7,270
118
Country
United Kingdom
if spoiled and blank ballots are the plurality winner or even the majority, in what sense has 'democracy' been served?
They're not the plurality by a longshot; invalid/blank votes came to just over 15%. Which is still damn significant, and indicates that Morales' call did have some traction (it was less than 6% in 2020), but is well behind 3 named candidates.

More notable is that turnout collapsed. From >85% to ~31%. And the leading candidate got only ~30% of that, so a piddling ~10% of registered voters.
 

Seanchaidh

Elite Member
Legacy
Mar 21, 2009
6,534
3,914
118
Country
United States of America
They put that question to a vote and the Bolivian people voted against amending the term limits.
It is possible for people to democratically decide to make their system less democratic and for that decision to be wrong even though democratically reached.

That was the whole basis behind the right taking down Morales in the first place. They were wrong for doing it, but this is clearly a case of Morales having sour grapes and blowing everything up.
He wasn't really in a position to blow things up all on his own. He needed a lot of voters on his side. Denying those voters their say isn't democratic even if that denial was popular/majoritarian.
 

Seanchaidh

Elite Member
Legacy
Mar 21, 2009
6,534
3,914
118
Country
United States of America
More notable is that turnout collapsed. From >85% to ~31%. And the leading candidate got only ~30% of that, so a piddling ~10% of registered voters.
Prompting the same question but with an altered premise: in what sense has democracy been served by the winner achieving the support of only ~10% of registered voters?
 

crimson5pheonix

It took 6 months to read my title.
Legacy
Jun 6, 2008
36,822
4,055
118
It is possible for people to democratically decide to make their system less democratic and for that decision to be wrong even though democratically reached.



He wasn't really in a position to blow things up all on his own. He needed a lot of voters on his side. Denying those voters their say isn't democratic even if that denial was popular/majoritarian.
Yeah, he's popular. My interpretation of the referendum results has always been that the people wouldn't mind Morales ruling again, but don't want to allow that from a constitutional standpoint since Morales isn't immortal. In that sense, Morales should have taken the hint and built MAS to survive him. Instead, he's picked a factional fight with Arce and detonated his own coalition.
 

Seanchaidh

Elite Member
Legacy
Mar 21, 2009
6,534
3,914
118
Country
United States of America
Yeah, he's popular. My interpretation of the referendum results has always been that the people wouldn't mind Morales ruling again, but don't want to allow that from a constitutional standpoint since Morales isn't immortal. In that sense, Morales should have taken the hint and built MAS to survive him. Instead, he's picked a factional fight with Arce and detonated his own coalition.
MAS without him (with him being banned, even) is vanishingly small, so it's a little weird to say that he picked the fight and detonated his coalition; his coalition was essentially excluded from competition by a small fragment of itself using state power. And there is no particular reason Evo should be satisfied with a version of MAS that prioritizes the interests of a different class of people than his own core constituency.
 

crimson5pheonix

It took 6 months to read my title.
Legacy
Jun 6, 2008
36,822
4,055
118
MAS without him (with him being banned, even) is vanishingly small, so it's a little weird to say that he picked the fight and detonated his coalition; his coalition was essentially excluded from competition by a small fragment of itself using state power. And there is no particular reason Evo should be satisfied with a version of MAS that prioritizes the interests of a different class of people than his own core constituency.
This started back when Morales came back from exile and he's had sour grapes the whole time. All of this started with sour grapes over the referendum. Morales comes across as pretty arrogant, I'm not surprised Arce started to exclude him since he seems to be in a fighting mood against Arce. No, Morales has spent the last few years showing why he shouldn't be elected again.
 
  • Like
Reactions: Mister Mumbler

XsjadoBlayde

~ just another dread messenger & artisanal kunt ~
Apr 29, 2020
3,900
3,994
118
Disturbing, fascinating, worrying rabbit hole. two delta force friends on holiday at Disneyland under influence of coke and MDMA, one murders the other in front of the victim's own daughter, gets away with it and is covered up. Al Qaeda even makes a cameo, for one half of the original founders was trained at fort Bragg and trained their own terrorist members on how to hijack planes using manuals and date directly from fort Bragg, who worked with the CIA before meeting and training bin laden, and who got a behind-closed-doors trial many years later for other bombings that never got reported on and has since been absorbed and totally disappeared into the military system since. everything's normal here
Murder, drug trafficking and the training of death squads. Just Fort Bragg Things. Journalist and author Seth Harp dropped by to chat with us about his explosive new book — The Fort Bragg Cartel: Drug Trafficking and Murder in the Special Forces. We talk about Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), Delta Force, and a variety of horrors beyond human comprehension.

Buy Seth Harp’s book: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/bo...

Follow Seth Harp: https://x.com/sethharpesq



Related article mentioned in episode;

‘Fort Bragg Has a Lot of Secrets. It’s Its Own Little Cartel’

An exclusive excerpt from Rolling Stone contributing editor Seth Harp’s new book, The Fort Bragg Cartel, reveals new details about a violent drug ring embedded in the U.S. Army Special Forces and the Airborne Corps

By Seth Harp
July 28, 2025

Former NC state trooper and DEA task force agent Freddie Wayne Huff and Rahain Deriggs, a sergeant in the Marine Corps, pose with military weapons stolen from Fort Bragg and money earned from trafficking cocaine with Los Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel.

Former North Carolina state trooper and DEA task force agent Freddie Wayne Huff and Rahain Deriggs, a sergeant in the Marine Corps, pose with military weapons stolen from Fort Bragg and money earned from trafficking cocaine with Los Zetas, a Mexican drug cartel.Courtesy of Freddie Huff

It has been more than four years since a pair of elite special operations soldiers were found murdered in the woods on Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and no one has been convicted of the crime. Master Sgt. William “Billy” Lavigne II, an active-duty Delta Force operator, and Chief Warrant Officer Timothy Dumas Sr., a logistics and supply soldier attached to the elite Joint Special Operations Command, had no shortage of potential enemies. Both men were deeply disillusioned with their military service, dealt drugs on base, worked with Mexican drug cartels to traffic cocaine by the kilo, and were heavy users in their own right. Both had killed people in the past, on American soil, and gotten away with it. And both were said to be writing tell-all books about their time in service and what they knew about organized crime in the Special Forces. So when their bodies turned up riddled with bullets and dumped on a remote training range of Fort Bragg on Dec. 2, 2020, the victims of an apparently professional hit by skilled assassins, few were very surprised that they had been murdered. But all these years later, the identity of the perpetrator or perpetrators remains a mystery.

In a surprise twist in a story that I have covered for the better part of five years, the Department of Justice in 2023 accused an unexpected person of orchestrating the hits on the 37-year-old Lavigne and 44-year-old Dumas. He has pleaded not guilty and his trial is expected to begin in early 2026. Meanwhile, there is another man, a profoundly corrupt police officer, who admits that he had a motive to kill Lavigne and Dumas and that, in the immediate aftermath of the murders, most of his underworld associates suspected him of the double homicide. His name is Freddie Wayne Huff II.




Freddie Wayne Huff, a North Carolina lawman born in 1980, never served in the military. All the same, his story of early promise, high achievement, subsequent disillusionment, loss of faith, turning against his former employer, and descent into addiction, drug trafficking, and violent crime closely paralleled the downward trajectories of Billy Lavigne and Timothy Dumas. Although the bare bones of his criminal exploits were reported in a few North Carolina publications, authorities kept his connection to events at Fort Bragg under wraps.

Freddie Huff joined the Lexington police force not long after high school. A self-described “obsessive perfectionist” who worked tirelessly to improve himself during the mania phases of his bipolar disorder, he quickly distinguished himself as a highly motivated young K9 officer with a preternatural ability to find drug money at traffic stops. Many a cartel courier, passing through North Carolina, lost a five- or six-figure sum to Officer Huff, a tall, solidly built, pink-skinned white man with hooded eyes and a high-and-tight haircut.


Courtesy of Viking Publishing

In 2009, Huff was deputized as a DEA task force officer and assigned to the El Paso Intelligence Center, or EPIC, the agency’s main source of intelligence on Mexican drug cartels. There, he became friends with a terminally ill DEA analyst, a bespectacled Black man named Karl Culberson, whose long and varied career working for the federal government included a self-reported stint with the CIA. Nearing death from pancreatic cancer, Culberson confessed something that changed the course of Huff’s life.

“What you think you’re doing is noble,” Culberson told Huff. “But they want it here. You’re a pawn. Everything you’re doing is in vain.”

Huff was quietly troubled by Culberson’s words, which he took to mean that the American government could stop the flow of drugs into the United States at any time but chooses not to. Nevertheless, he continued to work as a narcotics agent.

In 2010, Huff returned to the police force in Lexington, which lies about two hours north of Fort Bragg, and went back to doing what he did best: correctly guessing which passing motorists were carrying drug money, pulling them over, and confiscating the cash. A partial but revealing set of police records show that between 2010 and 2013, Huff seized $1.3 million from 25 motorists whom he detained for traffic infractions. All of the stops took place on the stretch of Interstate 85 between Charlotte and Greensboro, and every one of the suspects was a nonwhite man whom Huff pulled over for failing to signal, following too closely, going slightly over the speed limit, having obstructed state tags or a broken taillight, or some other minor offense.

On June 17, 2010, for instance, Huff stopped 33-year-old Felipe Fabela for tailgating. Lo and behold, Fabela turned out to have $449,360 concealed in a hidden compartment of his 1998 Mazda minivan. Three months earlier, Huff had pulled over 44-year-old Herman Alonso Rojas driving the same inconspicuous model of Mazda, which also had a concealed hiding place, and relieved him of $93,920. Rojas had been doing 75 in a 70.

With the money that Huff brought in, which he said amounted to more than $9 million, the police department built a new training facility in Lexington, bought a fleet of late-model vehicles, and invested in an arsenal of black assault rifles fresh from the factory. Huff moved up to the state highway patrol in 2013 but in spite of his stellar performance lasted scarcely a year on the job.

On March 16, 2014, Trooper Huff pulled over an inebriated insurance executive from Asheville who — he later learned — was a donor to North Carolina’s then-governor, Pat McCrory. Throughout the duration of the stop, the punch-drunk businessman repeatedly warned Huff that he was going to have his job, but Huff ticketed him anyway, for driving under the influence. Before the month was out, Huff had been fired on the petty pretense that he’d lied about having sold a pair of state-issued shoes on the auction site eBay, a trivial breach of department regulations.

Getting summarily canned for ticketing a crony of the governor’s, as Huff saw it, left him embittered toward the law enforcement profession. “When they fired me,” he said, “I lost everything. Lost my certifications. Lost my expert witness status. They blacklisted me.”

Recalling Culberson’s cynical words about the true power behind the global drug trade, Huff vowed then and there that if he ever had the opportunity, he would use his granular understanding of how police detect drug smugglers to make a killing in the game. “I told myself that if anything ever fell in my lap,” he recalled, “I was going to use every fucking thing I had known, learned, and taught against them.”

Huff’s opportunity to break bad was not long in coming. Thirty-five years old and in need of income to support himself, his wife, two children, and three adopted kids whom the Huffs had taken in from a household broken by poverty and abuse, Huff found work buying up damaged and defective appliances from a home improvement chain store and shipping them down to the Mexican border to be refurbished and resold. This mundane enterprise turned out to be reasonably remunerative. Huff was making enough money to get by, but sweating on the loading docks behind Lowe’s, grunting and grappling with heavy and cumbersome washers and dryers, he couldn’t stop thinking like a cop or a crook.

One of the intermediaries that Huff used to export inoperable appliances to Mexico was an unassuming establishment in Laredo, Texas, called Aguilar Appliance Repair. Through intuition and a little research, Huff ascertained that the import-export shop, housed in a pair of portable trailers on a dirt lot in one of the poorest neighborhoods of hot and sunny Laredo, was owned by relatives of Miguel Ángel Treviño Morales, who as Huff knew from his time at EPIC was one of the most notorious drug lords in the world. Until 2013, Treviño Morales had been the ruthless leader of the Nuevo Laredo–based paramilitary cartel known as Los Zetas.

Of all the drug cartels in Mexico, Los Zetas was by far the most feared. They were not just narcos. They were real soldiers, elite ones, trained in the United States. The cartel traced its origins to a joint project between the United States and Mexico to create a Mexican commando unit modeled on the Green Berets, called the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales, or Airborne Special Forces Group. The original members of the GAFE, as the unit was known by its initials in Spanish, were schooled in irregular warfare at none other than Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as well as Fort Benning, Georgia, and also received instruction from Israeli trainers. Around the year 2000, the majority of the unit defected from the Mexican state and went to work directly for the Matamoros-based Gulf Cartel, a powerful smuggling mafia that controlled the underside of the Texas border, serving as its armed wing and enforcer corps. Not long after, the rogue commandos again betrayed their employers, struck out on their own, and formed a rival cartel. “Los Zetas” was a reference to the alphanumeric call sign used by the group’s first boss, a Mexican special forces officer named Arturo Guzmán Decena.


The tools of the trade: guns, money, and drop phones that Freddie Huff and Timothy Dumas employed while trafficking cocaine to Fort Bragg soldiers.Courtesy of Freddie Huff

The advent of Los Zetas inaugurated the darkest era in all of Mexican history. Trained in marksmanship, rapid deployment, ambushes, surveillance, and psychological operations, Los Zetas used overt military force to consolidate control over most of the Texas border and the Gulf Coast port of Veracruz. Augmented by the state and local police forces that they co-opted, as well as an endless supply of short-lived hit men recruited from the lumpen class of the northern borderlands, Los Zetas wore paramilitary uniforms, drove around in homemade armored vehicles called monstruos, and, to sow terror, filmed themselves committing sickening atrocities. Countless thousands died in their raids, assaults, and sprees of arson. Countless thousands more were abducted and disappeared.


You’re the Most Badass White Boy I Ever Met

When the proprietor of Aguilar Appliance Repair came up to North Carolina in 2016 to pick up a load of washers and dryers, Huff invited her over to his house to meet his wife and kids. Though he looked, on first glance, like a big dumb gringo, Huff was cunning, charismatic, and street smart. Concealing the fact that he had been a state trooper and DEA task force agent, Huff gained the woman’s trust, gathered that she really was plugged into the Mexican drug world, and gradually let it be known that he was interested in buying wholesale narcotics. After a months-long courtship in which each side felt the other out, Ruben Treviño Morales, one of Miguel Ángel and Óscar Omar’s 15-odd siblings, agreed to meet Huff in person.

The improbable rendezvous took place in the parking lot of a Tex-Mex restaurant in McAllen, Texas. “He screamed cartel,” Huff recalled of his first look at the lesser-known Treviño Morales brother. “He wore super expensive designer clothes. He had a long pinkie nail,” for taking bumps of cocaine up his nose. “He looked like a Mexican Kenny Rogers.”

That an Anglo who spoke only broken Spanish and lacked any familial ties to Mexico could simply approach an exceedingly dangerous transnational crime syndicate like Los Zetas and arrange to become one of their distributors in the United States would seem like an implausible plot point in an unrealistic movie, yet that is exactly what Freddie Wayne Huff did, court records show. From 2016 to 2021, he was Los Zetas’ main man in the Carolinas, with an operation extending into Georgia and Virginia. He went on running his appliance business, which was profitable in its own right, and used it as a cover for trafficking cocaine. He rented a warehouse in High Point, a muggy, traffic-ridden suburb of Greensboro and Winston-Salem, bought moving trucks and tractor trailers, and hired employees. At the peak of his criminal career, Huff was moving 50 to 100 kilos of cocaine every seven to 10 days, putting him in the top tier of all traffickers in the United States. “You’re the most badass white boy I ever met,” Huff proudly recalled Treviño Morales telling him.

Drawing on his past work as a K9 officer, Huff helped Los Zetas’ border smugglers understand how to pack and conceal shipments to thwart drug-sniffing dogs by wrapping the kilos in shop towels soaked in ammonia, vacuum sealing them in plastic, and then repeating the process, enveloping the bricks in multiple fail-safe layers of a sharply pungent chemical that dogs will do anything to avoid. To defeat X-ray machines, he procured a tractor trailer whose rear differential axle had been hollowed out and lined with lead, a custom job that cost $50,000. “It took 13 bolts to take apart, but it looked much more complicated,” said Huff, who understood how to exploit the ordinary human laziness of customs agents, among other weaknesses in the narcotics-interdiction apparatus. He also advised the cartel’s couriers on how to hide money in cars. “It was like I was teaching a fucking school,” he said.

“Huff used the very information that he had gained as a law enforcement officer to then thwart law enforcement in order to improve his drug-dealing activity,” said the federal prosecutor Randall Galyon, an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina.


He Told Me About a Drug-Trafficking Organization Within the Military

For a personal hideout and base of operations, Huff rented a large redbrick house on Peppermill Drive in Lexington that had a four-car garage and basement, which he converted into a combination game room and home gym, replete with hidden compartments operated by means of electric motors activated by magnetic switches, in which stacks of money and kilos of cocaine were stored. There he received gangsters from across the state, as well as southern Virginia and northern Georgia, including Atlanta, as well as hustlers and mobsters from New Jersey, Connecticut, and Illinois. During his first two years in business, before he developed a sales pipeline to Fort Bragg, Huff mainly sold to street gangs in Raleigh, Charlotte, and the Piedmont Triad, a sprawling agglomeration of suburbs, strip malls, and office parks, home to some 1.6 million people, with High Point near its center. Shot callers from the Bloods, Crips, and Gangster Disciples would come to his McMansion of trap house to buy kilos at the wholesale price of forty grand, product that they broke up and distributed on the street.

For personal protection, Huff carried two identical subcompact handguns that were easy to conceal. “I had two Glocks, .380,” he told me. “They were really small. They only held six rounds but were very accurate. That’s why I always carried one on my ankle. If I ran out of bullets on top, I could go down on one knee and grab the one off my ankle, and that gave me 12 rounds maximum.”

Additional security came from a coterie of trained wingmen, almost all of whom were or had been police officers, sheriff’s deputies, marines from Camp Lejeune, or soldiers from Fort Bragg. Huff was effectively Los Zetas’ franchisee in North Carolina, and like Los Zetas his little cartel was made up almost entirely of cops and soldiers. “They were former law enforcement, former military,” said Randall Galyon, the federal prosecutor, of Huff’s accomplices. “Mr. Huff knew that they provided a set of skills that would be useful to him.”

One day in 2018, a pair of FBI agents showed up at Huff’s warehouse in High Point, an unexpected visit that shot a bolt of fear through his heart because he had $700,000 in drug money stashed in a washing machine in plain view. But it turned out that the agents only wanted to talk to him about one of his warehouse employees, Robert Seward, a bearded Black man from Fayetteville who had converted to Islam. A few years earlier, Seward had traveled to Syria and joined the Islamic State, only to become disillusioned with the austere path of jihad, escape from a training camp, and return to America. “You can’t make this shit up,” said Huff.

The FBI agents seemed to be keeping tabs on Seward, not looking to make an arrest. Huff gave them minimal information and kept Seward on as an employee, because he was well aware of what was packed inside of the washing machines, dryers, dishwashers, and stoves that it was his job to unload. “Robert knew what was going on,” said Huff. “He lived in one of the warehouses, and he turned a blind eye to shit. And one day he comes to me and he says, ‘I got this friend of mine who used to move a lot of cocaine. Would it be OK if I introduced you to him?’” Huff said yes.

Not long after, a quad-cab Dodge Ram, black with Alabama license plates, pulled up to the warehouse towing a flatbed trailer. In the driver’s seat was Chief Warrant Officer Timothy Dumas. “He gets out,” said Huff, “and he’s got on a Thin Blue Line bracelet, and he’s a very fit, muscular kind of guy.”

Dumas, a baldheaded, broad-chested Black man who woke up every morning around five o’clock to run and lift weights, and often wore a three-piece suit, fit the profile of the kind of man with whom Huff liked to work. “I preferred to deal with older, more mature people,” Huff said, “not thugs with their pants hanging around their ass.” Once they got to know each other, Huff and Dumas became not only business partners but best friends. “He was an amazing man,” said Huff. “Probably the most amazing guy I’ve ever met. No homo,” he hastened to add.


More than a million dollars’ worth of drugs in the basement of Freddie Huff’s stash house in Lexington, North Carolina.Courtesy of Freddie Huff

It’s one thing to traffic drugs internationally and smuggle them across the country undetected. It’s another, often more fraught thing to convert stacks of bulk cocaine into cash. What made Dumas such a valuable partner to Huff was that he could liquidate wholesale product at an incredible rate. The secret to his mercantile alacrity was Fort Bragg.

“Tim told me about basically a gang,” said Huff, “a drug-trafficking organization within the military,” made up of “an unspoken group of soldiers that policed themselves.” The bricks of coke that he passed off to Dumas were in turn distributed among the group, a confederation of semi-independent dealers in and around Fayetteville.

The core members of the underground military mafia, in Dumas’ telling, were Special Forces soldiers who had gone over to the dark side during deployments to Afghanistan. The main players were “guys that are trained killers, that have already killed people,” Huff said. As such, they played by cartel rules. In order to settle debts and resolve disputes, they “would resort to anything,” Huff said, “including murder.”


‘It Was Seriously Incriminating Shit’

Besides dealing drugs on base and off, “they were taking grenades,” Huff said, “taking automatic arms,” stealing them from Fort Bragg armories, and reselling them on the black market. Dumas’ role in the gun-trafficking portion of the conspiracy, before he was kicked out of the Army, was to falsify entries in the property book accounting system to keep anyone from noticing the disappearing items. “That was his job,” said Huff. “Maintaining records.”

During the second decade of the Global War on Terrorism, criminal organizations in the United States sourced much of their weaponry from corrupt members of all four branches of the armed forces. The Florencia 13 street gang bought assault rifles from marines stationed at Twentynine Palms, California; a Navy SEAL sold machine guns to the Mongols outlaw motorcycle club; and the Gangster Disciples obtained the pistols used in Chicago shootings from soldiers at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to name a few cases. American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines participate significantly in that clandestine “river of iron” that keeps Mexico’s paramilitary cartels, especially Los Zetas and their progeny, better supplied than the Mexican government with military-grade machine guns, grenades, antitank bazookas, helicopter-mounted rotary cannons called miniguns, and plastic explosives, as well as advanced laser optics and night-vision goggles.

In 2018, a pair of Fort Bragg soldiers attempted to sell dozens of stolen assault rifles and blocks of C‑4 to men whom they believed to be representatives of Los Zetas in El Paso. In June 2021, Associated Press published a multipart series, the product of a decade-long investigation, on the Army’s massive unacknowledged losses of weapons, and detailed the case of a single pistol stolen from Fort Bragg that was used in four shootings in New York. The soldier who diverted it to the black market was never identified.

Dumas introduced Huff to two of his closest cronies, both of whom had served at Fort Bragg. One was a Puerto Rican man named David Garcia, whom Dumas presented as his oldest Army buddy. “This is my brother,” he told Huff. “I’d do anything for him. I’d kill for him. I’d die for him.”

Dumas also introduced Huff to Orlando Fitzhugh, another 40-year-old Black man and former soldier. Fitzhugh, a veteran of the 82nd Airborne’s 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, had been investigated for dealing drugs on Fort Bragg in the 1990s and served time in the disciplinary barracks at Fort Leavenworth before being separated in 2000. He would go on to be convicted federally of trafficking cocaine in 2023.

Huff asked Garcia and Fitzhugh about the “military groups that trap narcotics,” but neither man was willing to discuss the subject. Huff was left with the impression that they were afraid of the repercussions of naming names. “Which was weird,” said Huff, “because these are people who are not scared of anything.”

One day in late 2019, Dumas came to the basement, handed Huff a thumb drive, and told him to keep it in a safe place. On the memory stick was a blackmail letter that Dumas had previously shown to two other people: his teenage son, Timothy Dumas, Jr., and a Waffle House waitress whom he used to hook up with named Brianna Woods. The younger Dumas and Woods both told me that the document contained allegations of drug crime in the Special Forces and that Dumas had written it with the intention of exerting leverage on the Army to reinstate his forfeited pension.

So far, Dumas had not carried out his threat to reveal the contents of the letter. Now, he told Huff, he wanted to use it as a kind of dead man’s switch. If anything happened to him, he wanted it made public. “It was like his insurance policy,” said Huff.

Huff stashed the thumb drive in the drawer of a minibar in the basement of his house in Lexington. But before doing so, he plugged it into his computer and opened the word processing document. “I read the whole thing in depth,” he said. “It was seriously incriminating shit.”

Although four sources independently attested to the existence of Dumas’ “insurance policy,” and described its contents in broadly similar terms, Huff alone claimed to have actually read the text. According to him, the lengthy letter was addressed to a high-ranking general and alleged that “soldiers were involved in bringing opiates from Afghanistan and distributing it on Fort Bragg.” The letter specifically identified the service members who were supposedly transporting commercial quantities of occupied Afghanistan’s marquee national product into the United States. “It names each one of them dudes,” Huff said.

Several years had gone by and Huff was unable to recall any of their identities from memory except one. Subsequent events ensured that he would not forget one particular dealer with whom Dumas worked: a white guy in the Army known to Huff, as well as Dumas, as Will Lavigne. “He was dispersing methamphetamine and cocaine,” Huff said of Lavigne, on Fort Bragg itself and “to military personnel in and around Fayetteville.”

He added, “Fort Bragg has a lot of secrets. A lot of underground narcotics secrets. It’s its own little cartel.”
Excerpted from the book THE FORT BRAGG CARTEL by Seth Harp, to be published by Viking on Aug. 12, 2025.
Sorta reminds of a really great Christian Bale film called Harsh Times, he does a frightening performance as well as a scene involving the worst idea for tryong to pass a drug urine test I've ever seen
 
  • Like
Reactions: BrawlMan

Agema

Overhead a rainbow appears... in black and white
Legacy
Mar 3, 2009
10,996
7,953
118
Disturbing, fascinating, worrying rabbit hole. two delta force friends on holiday at Disneyland under influence of coke and MDMA, one murders the other in front of the victim's own daughter, gets away with it and is covered up. Al Qaeda even makes a cameo, for one half of the original founders was trained at fort Bragg and trained their own terrorist members on how to hijack planes using manuals and date directly from fort Bragg, who worked with the CIA before meeting and training bin laden, and who got a behind-closed-doors trial many years later for other bombings that never got reported on and has since been absorbed and totally disappeared into the military system since. everything's normal here
These days the military do love to tell potential recruits what amazing skills they can learn that they can use in non-military careers. I'm sure they don't talk about the criminal careers in recruitment ads, but the ability to sneak around and inflict serious violence is surely an incredibly good skill set for criminal organisations.

I'm pretty sure there are criminal organisations and right-wing terrorist groups who send their tyros to the military for this very reason, so they can bring back that expertise to the operation. May as well have the government spend the money to train their grunts rather than do it themselves, and a delicious irony too.
 

XsjadoBlayde

~ just another dread messenger & artisanal kunt ~
Apr 29, 2020
3,900
3,994
118
These days the military do love to tell potential recruits what amazing skills they can learn that they can use in non-military careers. I'm sure they don't talk about the criminal careers in recruitment ads, but the ability to sneak around and inflict serious violence is surely an incredibly good skill set for criminal organisations.

I'm pretty sure there are criminal organisations and right-wing terrorist groups who send their tyros to the military for this very reason, so they can bring back that expertise to the operation. May as well have the government spend the money to train their grunts rather than do it themselves, and a delicious irony too.
The relationship is far more symbiotic and historical than many realise

Organized Crime as Irregular Warfare: Strategic Lessons for Assessment and Response

By David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks PRISM Vol. 10, No. 3

Download PDF

Dr. David H. Ucko is a professor at the College of International Security Affairs (CISA) of the National Defense University. Dr. Thomas A. Marks is Distinguished Professor & MG Edward G. Lansdale Chair of Irregular Warfighting Strategy at National Defense University.

[IMG alt="Military incursion in the valley area of the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM) where drugs such as cocaine
are produced. Apurimac, Peru, November 26, 2011. Photo by David Human Bedoya at Shutterstock ID: 1961528875."]https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Images/prism/prism_10-3/ucko-marks-1.webp[/IMG]
Military incursion in the valley area of the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro rivers (VRAEM) where drugs such as cocaine are produced. Apurimac, Peru, November 26, 2011. Photo by David Human Bedoya at Shutterstock ID: 1961528875.N

Organized crime both preys upon and caters to human need. It is corrosive and exploitative, but also empowering, and therefore pervasive. Indeed, though often out of sight, organized crime is everywhere: wherever governments draw the line, criminal actors find profitable ways of crossing it; wherever governments fail to deliver on human need, criminal actors capitalize on unmet desire or despair. For those excluded from the political economy, from patronage systems or elite bargains, organized crime can offer opportunity, possibly also protection. On aggregate, it amounts to an illicit form of governance, furnishing alternative services to a wide range of clients—be it the vulnerable and weak or a covetous elite. Reflecting the strength and resilience of this illicit order, those who stand in its way—individuals, institutions, even states—find themselves corrupted, co-opted, or violently eliminated.

The breadth of organized crime, its clandestine nature, and its blending of creative and destructive effects present acute analytical and policy-related challenges. Much like the response to the threat of terrorism post-9/11, our efforts to counter organized crime are stymied by 1) conceptual uncertainty of the problem at hand; 2) an urge to address the scourge head-on without acknowledging its socioeconomic-political context; and, therefore, 3) unquestioned pursuit of strategies that miss the point, whose progress is difficult to measure, and which may even be counterproductive. Thus, despite occasional operational success, the global illicit economy continues to grow so that, by 2021, 80 percent of the world’s population lived in countries with high levels of crime and low levels of resilience to its effects.1

In the case of counterterrorism, irregular warfare (IW) emerged as a corrective lens, in that it framed terroristic violence within its essential political context and as a component of a broader struggle of legitimacy. This approach has encouraged a more politically informed understanding of terrorism, insurgency, and other irregular challenges. Might a similar lens also improve our understanding and approach to organized crime? The convergence between the two phenomena suggests a way forward.

First, much like terrorism and insurgency, organized crime is a scourge that survives due to the functions and benefits it provides to desperate populations with few other options. Second, both are intensely political—if not in motivation, then certainly in origins, activities, and effects. Third, much like irregular threats, organized crime is oppositional to the rule of law and feeds on the state’s vulnerabilities. Fourth, both problems expose deep cracks in an international system supposedly governed by capable states exercising sovereignty over their peoples and lands. Fifth, both phenomena have a clandestine facet but are enmeshed with the licit world in often unpredictable ways. Thus, much like counterinsurgency, efforts to counter organized crime must operate both underground and above-ground, both counter a threat and address its drivers, and proceed with far greater awareness of what constitutes success—and for whom.

Based on these commonalities, this article applies the insight of IW to the study of and response to organized crime. The argument is divided into three parts. First, the paper makes the case that, despite key differences, organized crime shares fundamental features with other irregular challenges—principally insurgency. Second, the paper lays out six major lessons of irregular warfare, informed by the bruising campaigns associated with the “War on Terror.” Third, the paper applies these lessons to various state efforts to counter organized crime. The analysis challenges how organized crime is typically understood—its character, expression, and purpose—and encourages a more politically informed way of assessing and responding to this threat.


The Overlap: Organized Crime and Irregular Warfare

Much like terrorism, organized crime is at once easy to intuit but difficult to define. If policymakers can be accused of adopting too narrow a focus on the criminal behavior itself, academics often overtheorize the concept to the point of irrelevance. For the purposes of this analysis, organized crime is defined as any group, with some degree of structure, whose primary objective is profit and whose methods include illegal activity, ranging from the use of force, to the corruption of public officials and predation of civilian populations. This definition captures some of the phenomenon’s key components: its 1) collective nature; 2) pecuniary objective; 3) illicit ways; and 4) exploitative effects.

These components allow organized crime to nest conceptually within irregular warfare. The U.S. Department of Defense defines irregular warfare as “a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy.” It adds that “IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”2 In other words, irregular warfare like organized crime, is concerned with 1) collective action, that 2) uses violence among other illicit methods, and 3) which has corrupting, or outright destructive, effects on society.

As a rubric, IW comprises principally the challenges of insurgency and terrorism. The contribution of the IW lens is that it posits these threats as components of a contest for legitimacy, wherein violence merely supports a political struggle. In contrast to the “regular wars” that, supposedly, are won just through military means, irregular actors combine several lines of effort, weaponize narratives to gain or erode support, and exploit societal, economic, and political weaknesses to build strength and sustain the challenge. This is the playbook of insurgents, forcing governments to respond in kind, via political and informational channels and with security forces in support.3

The major difference between organized crime and IW actors is the objective: insurgents or terrorists pursue a political or ideological objective whereas criminals are thought to be concerned solely with profit. Still, much like insurgents, actors involved in organized crime shape the surrounding political landscape to maximize profit, be it through corruption, the erosion of institutions, or their insistence on impunity. In effect, the organized criminal element is engaging in a “struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy.” The goal is to align behavior with the criminal business model, so that an illicit alternative emerges to the rule of law. In this way, criminal enteprises come to determine “who gets what, and when,” which is the very essence of politics.4

Given these commonalities, the response to organized crime and to insurgency should also overlap. In suggesting counterinsurgency theory as a crime-fighting tool, a caveat is immediately needed given the term’s military connotations. The point is not to militarize further the response to organized crime. Instead, counterinsurgency in its theory is a political activity. Its contribution to consideration of organized crime is to cast the phenomenon as fueled by specific political and social drivers which must, alongside the criminal actors, also be addressed—perhaps as the primary focus. In a similar vein, the purpose of irregular warfare (despite its allusion to war) is to position the competition of legitimacy and influence over contested populations as the primary concern, and the violence as a contingent component of the overall struggle.

The discussion of legitimacy requires two clarifications. First, the state cannot in any way assume to hold legitimacy merely because it is “duly constituted” or has legal status. The tendency to view the state unquestioningly as a provider, and its enemies as the threat, wishes away the very heart of the problem: a lack of government legitimacy and split loyalties among the population. Legitimacy is subjective, fluid, contextual, and contested; nothing can be taken for granted.

Second, legitimacy in irregular warfare is not a popularity contest but speaks instead to the “right to lead.” Winning legitimacy means controlling or co-opting contested populations, or shaping the “beliefs and attitudes of the affected actors regarding the normative status of a rule, government, political system or governance regime.”5 Popular views can be shaped mainly through coercion, but sustaining cooperation is made easier if co-option also plays a role. Either way, gaining legitimacy means more than emotive affinity; it also involves a self-interested calculation that such loyalty is likely to pay off. This is, indeed, what is meant by winning both hearts and minds.
(Only a fraction of the full page, it's lengthy)



INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1999 (House of Representatives - May 07, 1998)

A Tangled Web: A History of CIA Complicity in Drug International Trafficking
Institute for Policy Studies




WORLD WAR II
The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), the CIA's parent and sister organizations, cultivate relations with the leaders of the Italian Mafia, recruiting heavily from the New York and Chicago underworlds, whose members, including Charles `Lucky' Luciano, Meyer Lansky, Joe Adonis, and Frank Costello, help the agencies keep in touch with Sicilian Mafia leaders exiled by Italian dictator Benito Mussolini. Domestically, the aim is to prevent sabotage on East Coast ports, while in Italy the goal is to gain intelligence on Sicily prior to the allied invasions and to suppress the burgeoning Italian Communist Party. Imprisoned in New York, Luciano earns a pardon for his wartime service and is deported to Italy, where he proceeds to build his heroin empire, first by diverting supplies from the legal market, before developing connections in Lebanon and Turkey that supply morphine base to labs in Sicily. The OSS and ONI also work closely with Chinese gangsters who control vast supplies of opium, morphine and heroin, helping to establish the third pillar of the post-world War II heroin trade in the Golden Triangle, the border region of Thailand, Burma, Laos and China's Yunnan Province.

1947
In its first year of existence, the CIA continues U.S. intelligence community's anti-communist drive. Agency operatives help the Mafia seize total power in Sicily and it sends money to heroin-smuggling Corsican mobsters in Marseille to assist in their battle with Communist unions for control of the city's docks. By 1951, Luciano and the Corsicans have pooled their resources, giving rise to the notorious `French Connection' which would dominate the world heroin trade until the early 1970s. The CIA also recruits members of organized crime gangs in Japan to help ensure that the country stays in the non-communist world. Several years later, the Japanese Yakuza emerges as a major source of methamphetamine in Hawaii.

1949
Chinese Communist revolution causes collapse of drug empire allied with U.S. intelligence community, but a new one quickly emerges under the command of Nationalist (KMT) General Li Mi, who flees Yunnan into eastern Burma. Seeking to rekindle anticommunist resistance in China, the CIA provides arms, ammunition and other supplies to the KMT. After being repelled from China with heavy losses, the KMT settles down with local population and organizes and expands the opium trade from Burma and Northern Thailand. By 1972, the KMT controls 80 percent of the Golden Triangle's opium trade.

1950
The CIA launches Project Bluebird to determine whether certain drugs might improve its interrogation methods. This eventually leads CIA head Allen Dulles, in April 1953, to institute a program for `covert use of biological and chemical materials' as part of the agency's continuing efforts to control behavior. With benign names such as Project Artichoke and Project Chatter, these projects continue through the 1960s, with hundreds of unwitting test subjects given various drugs, including LSD.

1960
In support of the U.S. war in Vietnam, the CIA renews old and cultivates new relations with Laotian, Burmese and Thai drug merchants, as well as corrupt military and political leaders in Southeast Asia. Despite the dramatic rise of heroin production, the agency's relations with these figures attracts little attention until the early 1970s.

1967
Manuel Antonio Noriega goes on the CIA payroll. First recruited by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in 1959, Noriega becomes an invaluable asset for the CIA when he takes charge of Panama's intelligence service after the 1968 military coup, providing services for U.S. covert operations and facilitating the use of Panama as the center of U.S. intelligence gathering in Latin America. In 1976, CIA Director George Bush pays Noriega $110,000 for his services, even though as early as 1971 U.S. officials agents had evidence that he was deeply involved in drug trafficking. Although the Carter administration suspends payments to Noriega, he returns to the U.S. payroll when President Reagan takes office in 1981. The general is rewarded handsomely for his services in support of Contras forces in Nicaragua during the 1980s, collecting $200,000 from the CIA in 1986 alone.

MAY 1970
A Christian Science Monitor correspondent reports that the CIA `is cognizant of, if not party to, the extensive movement of opium out of Laos,' quoting one charter pilot who claims that `opium shipments get special CIA clearance and monitoring on their flights southward out of the country.' At the time, some 30,000 U.S. service men in Vietnam are addicted to heroin.

1972
The full story of how Cold War politics and U.S. covert operations fueled a heroin boom in the Golden Triangle breaks when Yale University doctoral student Alfred McCoy publishes his ground-breaking study, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. The CIA attempts to quash the book.

1973
Thai national Puttapron Khramkhruan is arrested in connection with the seizure of 59 pounds of opium in Chicago. A CIA informant on narcotics trafficking in northern Thailand, he claims that agency had full knowledge
of his actions. According to the U.S. Justice Department, the CIA quashed the case because it may `prove embarrassing because of Mr. Khramkhruans's involvement with CIA activities in Thailand, Burma, and elsewhere.'

JUNE 1975
Mexican police, assisted by U.S. drug agents, arrest Alberto Sicilia Falcon, whose Tijuana-based operation was reportedly generating $3.6 million a week from the sale of cocaine and marijuana in the United States. The Cuban exile claims he was a CIA protege, trained as part of the agency's anti-Castro efforts, and in exchange for his help in moving weapons to certain groups in Central America, the CIA facilitated his movement of drugs. In 1974, Sicilia's top aide, Jose Egozi, a CIA-trained intelligence officer and Bay of Pigs veteran, reportedly lined up agency support for a right-wing plot to overthrow the Portuguese government. Among the top Mexican politicians, law enforcement and intelligence officials from whom Sicilia enjoyed support was Miguel Nazar Haro, head of the Direccion Federal de Seguridad (DFS), who the CIA admits was its `most important source in Mexico and Central America.' When Nazar was linked to a multi-million-dollar stolen car ring several years later, the CIA intervenes to prevent his indictment in the United States.

APRIL 1978
Soviet-backed coup in Afghanistan sets stage for explosive growth in Southwest Asian heroin trade. New Marxist regime undertakes vigorous anti-narcotics campaign aimed at suppressing poppy production, triggering a revolt by semi-autonomous tribal groups that traditionally raised opium for export. The CIA-supported rebel Mujahedeen begins expanding production to finance their insurgency. Between 1982 and 1989, during which time the CIA ships billions of dollars in weapons and other aid to guerrilla forces, annual opium production in Afghanistan increases to about 800 tons from 250 tons. By 1986, the State Department admits that Afghanistan is `probably the world's largest producer of opium for export' and `the poppy source for a majority of the Southwest Asian heroin found in the United States.' U.S. officials, however, fail to take action to curb production. Their silence not only serves to maintain public support for the Mujahedeen, it also smooths relations with Pakistan, whose leaders, deeply implicated in the heroin trade, help channel CIA support to the Afghan rebels.

[Page: H2956]

JUNE 1980
Despite advance knowledge, the CIA fails to halt members of the Bolivian militaries, aide by the Argentine counterparts, from staging the so-called `Cocaine Coup,' according to former DEA agent Michael Levine. In fact, the 25-year DEA veteran maintains the agency actively abetted cocaine trafficking in Bolivia, where government official who sought to combat traffickers faced `torture and death at the hands of CIA-sponsored paramilitary terrorists under the command of fugitive Nazi war criminal (also protected by the CIA) Klaus Barbie.

FEBRUARY 1985
DEA agent Enrique `Kiki' Camerena is kidnapped and murder in Mexico. DEA, FBI and U.S. Customs Service investigators accuse the CIA of stonewalling during their investigation. U.S. authorities claim the CIA is more interested in protecting its assets, including top drug trafficker and kidnapping principal Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo. (In 1982, the DEA learned that Felix Gallardo was moving $20 million a month through a single Bank of America account, but it could not get the CIA to cooperate with its investigation.) Felix Gallardo's main partner is Honduran drug lord Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros, who began amassing his $2-billion fortune as a cocaine supplier to Alberto Sicilia Falcon. (see June 1985) Matta's air transport firm, SETCO, receives $186,000 from the U.S. State Department to fly `humanitarian supplies' to the Nicaraguan Contras from 1983 to 1985. Accusations that the CIA protected some of Mexico's leading drug traffickers in exchange for their financial support of the Contras are leveled by government witnesses at the trials of Camarena's accused killers.

JANUARY 1988
Deciding that he has outlived his usefulness to the Contra cause, the Reagan Administration approves an indictment of Noriega on drug charges. By this time, U.S. Senate investigators had found that `the United States had received substantial information about criminal involvement of top Panamanian officials for nearly twenty years and done little to respond.'

APRIL 1989
The Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Communications, headed by Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, issues its 1,166-page report on drug corruption in Central America and the Caribbean. The subcommittee found that `there was substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zone on the part of individuals Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots, mercenaries who worked with the Contras supporters throughout the region.' U.S. officials, the subcommittee said, `failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the war efforts against Nicaragua.' The investigation also reveals that some `senior policy makers' believed that the use of drug money was `a perfect solution to the Contras' funding problems.'

JANUARY 1993
Honduran businessman Eugenio Molina Osorio is arrested in Lubbock Texas for supplying $90,000 worth of cocaine to DEA agents. Molina told judge he is working for CIA to whom he provides political intelligence. Shortly after, a letter from CIA headquarters is sent to the judge, and the case is dismissed. `I guess we're all aware that they [the CIA] do business in a different way than everybody else,' the judge notes. Molina later admits his drug involvement was not a CIA operation, explaining that the agency protected him because of his value as a source for political intelligence in Honduras.

NOVEMBER 1996
Former head of the Venezuelan National Guard and CIA operative Gen. Ramon Gullien Davila is indicted in Miami on charges of smuggling as much as 22 tons of cocaine into the United States. More than a ton of cocaine was shipped into the country with the CIA's approval as part of an undercover program aimed at catching drug smugglers, an operation kept secret from other U.S. agencies.





How the Taliban crushed the CIA's heroin bonanza in Afghanistan

The Taliban has not once, but twice eradicated Afghanistan's poppy cultivation, the world's largest source of heroin. Despite western accusations, it has never been The Taliban behind the Afghan drug industry, but only ever the US and its allies, with billions in profits breezily laundered through the global financial system.

JUL 7, 2023



In the aftermath of the chaotic US and UK withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir warned in the Washington Post of the dangers of “ignoring one important consequence of the Taliban takeover: the coming boom in Afghanistan’s narcotics trade.”


Mir then boldly predicted that, “in the next few years, a flood of drugs from Afghanistan may become a bigger threat than terrorism.”

This projection of an international drug trade boom seemed plausible, considering the longstanding accusations that the Taliban funded their two-decade insurgency against the occupying forces by controlling opium production. In fact, it was believed that 95 percent of heroin used in Britain originated from Afghan opium.

It comes as a surprise then, that a June 2023 report published by Alcis, a British-based geographic information services firm, revealed that the Taliban government had all but eliminated opium cultivation in the country, wiping out the base ingredient needed to produce heroin. This outcome mirrored a similar move by the Taliban in 2000 when they were in power for the first time.

Ironically, instead of praising Kabul's new leaders for quashing the source of illicit drugs, the international community responded to this development with criticism. Even the US Institute for Peace (USIP), which is funded by the US government, argued that “The Taliban’s successful opium ban is bad for Afghans and the world.”

Such western displeasure towards the Taliban's efforts to dismantle the global heroin trade may seem perplexing at first glance.

However, a closer examination of events in Afghanistan reveals a different perspective. Under the guise of the “War on Terror,” the 2001 US and UK invasion was driven in part by the desire to restore the heroin trade, which the Taliban had abruptly terminated just a year earlier.

The western powers sought to reestablish the lucrative flow of billions of dollars that the heroin trade provided to their financial systems. In fact, “For 20 years, America essentially ran a narco-state in Afghanistan.”
Dollar for Dollar’

To understand the origins of the Afghan heroin trade, a review of US involvement in the central Asian nation is necessary, beginning in 1979 when the CIA embarked on a covert program to undermine the pro-Soviet Afghan government in Kabul.
The US covertly supported an umbrella of Muslim guerrilla fighters known as mujahideen, with the hope that provoking an insurgency would entice the Soviet Army to intervene. This calculated move would force the Soviets into occupying Afghanistan and engaging in a protracted and costly counter-insurgency campaign, thereby weakening the Soviet Union over time.

To accomplish this, the CIA turned to its close allies, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, for help. Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan facilitated a meeting between CIA Director William Casey and Saudi King Fahd, in which the Saudis committed to matching “America dollar for dollar supporting the mujahedeen.”

The US and Saudi Arabia, with help from Pakistani's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), set up training camps for the mujahideen in Pakistan, and supplied them with advisors, weapons, and cash to fight the Soviets.

Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, the founder of the Hizb-i-Islami militia, was among the most prominent mujahideen leaders, receiving some $600 million in aid from the CIA and its allies.

Journalist Steve Coll writes in his Pulitzer Prize-winning book Ghost Wars that Hekymatyar recruited from the most radical, anti-western, transnational Islamist networks to fight with him, including Osama bin Laden and other Arab volunteers. CIA officers “embraced Hekmatyar as their most dependable and effective ally,” and “the most efficient at killing Soviets.”

Caravans of opium

Aid to Hekymatyar and other mujahideen leaders was not limited to cash and weapons. According to renowned historian Alfred McCoy:

“1979 and 1980, just as the CIA effort was beginning to ramp up, a network of heroin laboratories opened along the Afghan-Pakistan frontier. That region soon became the world’s largest heroin producer.”
The process involved smuggling raw opium gum to Pakistan, where it was processed into heroin in laboratories run by the ISI. The finished product was then discreetly transported via Pakistani airports, ports, or overland routes.

By 1984, Afghan heroin supplied a staggering 60 percent of the US market and 80 percent of the European market, while devastatingly creating 1.3 million heroin addicts in Pakistan, a country previously untouched by the highly-addictive drug.

McCoy states further that, “caravans carrying CIA arms into that region for the resistance often returned to Pakistan loaded down with opium.” Reports from 2001 cited by the New York Times confirmed that this occurred “with the assent of Pakistani or American intelligence officers who supported the resistance.”

In May 1990, the Washington Post reported that the US government had for several years received, but declined to investigate, reports of heroin trafficking by its allies, including “firsthand accounts of heroin smuggling by commanders under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.”

Rise of the Taliban

When the Soviets did finally withdraw in 1989, the country fell into civil war as the major CIA-backed factions began fighting among themselves for control of the country. Mujahideen leaders became warlords and committed terrible atrocities against the local population while fighting amongst themselves.

It was during this anarchy that religious students from the madrassas (seminary schools), the Taliban, emerged with the help of Pakistani intelligence to take control of the country in 1996, subsequently inheriting the opium trade, which continued unhindered for several years.

In July 2000, however, Taliban leader Mullah Omar ordered a ban on all opium cultivation. Remarkably, the Taliban successfully slashed the opium harvest by 94 percent, reducing yearly production to only 185 metric tons.

Five months later, in December 2000, the US and Russia used the UN Security Council to impose harsh new sanctions on Afghanistan, citing the Taliban’s refusal to hand over Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden following the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen, in which 17 US sailors were killed. Bin Laden had taken refuge in the Islamic Emirate in 1996 after he was expelled from Sudan.

The New York Times reported that US officials sought to impose the new sanctions, despite warnings from the UN that “a million Afghans could face starvation in coming months because of a drought and continued civil war.”

Following the attacks on 11 September, 2001, Bush administration officials demanded the Taliban hand over Bin Laden once again. Mullah Omar insisted the US first provide evidence of Bin Laden's guilt, but President Bush refused this request and ordered the US air force to begin bombing Afghanistan on 7 October.

In the wake of the bombing, Mullah Omar dropped the demand for evidence, and offered to hand over Bin Laden to US ally Pakistan for trial. Bush administration officials once again refused.

Journalist and author Scott Horton highlights in his book Fool’s Errand a peculiar aspect of the US campaign: the lack of a clear focus on capturing or eliminating Bin Laden. In fact, President Bush had already stated on 25 September that success or failure should not be defined solely by capturing Bin Laden.

Horton notes further that US planners made no initial effort to hunt down Bin Laden and the foreign Arab fighters supporting him. Instead, head of US Central Command, General Tommy Franks prioritized partnering with Afghan warlord Rashid Dostum to take control of the north of the country, and establish a “land link” to Uzbekistan.

Turning to the warlords

To also capture the capital, Kabul, and other key cities in the south, Alfred McCoy notes the CIA:

“Turned to a group of rising Pashtun warlords along the Pakistan border who had been active as drug smugglers in the south-eastern part of the country. As a result, when the Taliban collapsed, the groundwork had already been laid for the resumption of opium cultivation and the drug trade on a major scale.”

Though US forces were too late to prevent Bin Laden’s escape to Pakistan, the US bombing campaign came just in time for the beginning of poppy planting season. Poppies are planted in the autumn so that the juice from the plant, from which opium is extracted, can be harvested in spring.

McCoy clarified further that, “the Agency (CIA) and its local allies created ideal conditions for reversing the Taliban's opium ban and reviving the drug traffic. Only weeks after the collapse of the Taliban, officials were reporting an outburst of poppy planting in the heroin-heartlands of Helmand and Nangarhar.”

In December, one of these rising Pashtun warlords, Hamid Karzai, was appointed Chairman of the Afghan Interim Administration and later president.

By the spring of 2002, large amounts of Afghan heroin were once again being transported to Britain via daily flights from Pakistani airports. The Guardian observed the case of a 13-year-old girl who was stopped after she stepped off a Pakistan International Airlines flight from Islamabad to London carrying 13kgs of heroin with a street value of £910,000.

Industrial scale

Thanks to the “land link” established by General Franks, heroin also immediately began flowing north from Mazar-e-Sharif, under CIA ally Rashid Dostum’s control, to Uzbekistan and then to to Russia and Europe.

The flow of heroin was witnessed by Craig Murray, the British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, who explained that Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek, facilitated the smuggling of heroin from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan, where it was then shipped up the railway line, in bales of cotton, to Moscow and then Riga. As Murray noted:

“Opium is converted into heroin on an industrial scale, not in kitchens but in factories. Millions of gallons of the chemicals needed for this process are shipped into Afghanistan by tanker…The four largest players in the heroin business are all senior members of the Afghan government – the government that our soldiers are fighting and dying to protect.”
‘A hands off approach’

In addition to Dostum, Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s younger brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, quickly secured a prominent role in the Afghan heroin trade.

Credible reports emerged that Wali Karzai was deeply involved in the heroin trade, however, according to the New York Times, the incidents were never investigated, “even though allegations that he has benefited from narcotics trafficking have circulated widely in Afghanistan.”

Senior officials at the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) complained that the Bush “White House favored a hands-off approach toward Ahmed Wali Karzai because of the political delicacy of the matter.”

The Times later reported that according to a top former Afghan Interior Ministry official, a major source of Wali Karzai’s influence was his control over key bridges crossing the Helmand River on the route between the opium-growing regions of Helmand Province and Kandahar. This allowed Karzai to charge huge fees to drug traffickers to allow their drug-laden trucks to cross the bridges.

Like Dostum and Hekmaytar, Wali Karzai built his heroin empire while on the CIA payroll. The agency began paying Karzai in 2001 to recruit an Afghan paramilitary force that operated at the agency’s direction in and around Kandahar and to rent a large compound for use as the base of the Kandahar Strike Force. The CIA also appreciated Karzai’s help in communicating and sometimes meeting with Afghans loyal to the Taliban.

Karzai also served as the head of Kandahar's elected provincial council. According to a senior US military officer in Kabul quoted by the Times, “Hundreds of millions of dollars in drug money are flowing through the southern region, and nothing happens in southern Afghanistan without the regional leadership knowing about it.”

The blame game

In late 2004, as reports of Karzai’s involvement in the heroin trade were emerging, Alfred McCoy writes that “the White House was suddenly confronted with troubling CIA intelligence suggesting that the escalating drug trade was fueling a revival of the Taliban.”

A proposal from Secretary of State Colin Powell to fight the heroin trade was resisted by US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, and then-Afghan finance minister Ashraf Ghani. As a compromise, the Bush administration used private contractors for poppy eradication, an effort that New York Times journalist Carlotta Gall later described as “something of a joke.”

Additionally, reports of a 2005 cable sent by the US embassy in Kabul to Powell's successor, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, viewed Britain as being "substantially responsible" for the failure to eradicate poppy cultivation. British personnel chose where the eradication teams worked, but those areas were often not the main growing areas, and “the British had been unwilling to revise targets.”

The cable also faulted President Karzai, who "has been unwilling to assert strong leadership.” The State Department nevertheless defended him, saying, “President Karzai is a strong partner, and we have confidence in him," despite reports of his brother’s key role in the heroin trade.

But the problem went beyond Wali Karzai. A UN report for the World Bank published in February 2006 concluded the Afghan heroin trade was operating with the assistance of many top Afghan government officials and under the protection of the Afghan Ministry of Interior.

As evidence of CIA and Afghan government involvement in the heroin trade grew, the focus of the western media shifted towards blaming the Taliban for using drug profits to fund their insurgency against foreign forces.

However, historian Peter Dale Scott challenged this narrative, citing UN estimates that the Taliban's share of the Afghan opium economy was a fraction compared to that of supporters of the Karzai government. Scott emphasized that the largest share of the drug trade was controlled by those aligned with the Afghan government.

The surge

In early 2010, the Obama administration announced a “surge” of 33,000 US troops to help pacify the country, with a particular focus on key districts known for poppy cultivation. One such district was Marja in Helmand province, which McCoy referred to as “the world's heroin capital.”

Despite the surge's mission, US commanders seemed unaware of Marja's significance as a hub for heroin production, fueled by the surrounding opium fields that accounted for 40 percent of the world's illicit opium supply.

In September 2010, eight months after the start of the surge, “unsubstantiated” reports emerged that British soldiers were involved in trafficking heroin out of Afghanistan using military aircraft at airports in Camp Bastion and Kandahar.

Camp Bastion, jointly operated by the UK and the US, was located near Lashkar Gah, another major center of poppy cultivation. In 2012, it was alleged that poppy cultivation was taking place just outside the base's perimeter, with British soldiers providing protection to farmers against Afghan security forces.

By late 2014, British and US forces withdrew from Camp Bastion, handing it over to Afghan forces, who renamed it Camp Shorabak. However, according to a UN report, “the opium-growing area around Britain’s main base in Afghanistan nearly quadrupled between 2011 and 2013.”

Despite the withdrawal, opium exports from Camp Shorabak apparently continued, and a small number of British military personnel returned in 2015 in what was described by the Ministry of Defense as an advisory role.

In 2016, Obaidullah Barakzai, a member of the National Assembly of Afghanistan, claimed, “It’s impossible for a few local drug smugglers to transfer opium in thousands of kilos. This is the work of the Americans and British. They transport it by air from Camp Shorabak.”

After US forces chaotically withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban once again succeeded in eliminating poppy cultivation, showing it was far from a “dedicated drug cartel” after all.

Follow the money

In November 2021, an opium merchant claimed that “All the profits go to the foreign countries. Afghans are just supplying the labor.”

Peter Dale Scott noted that according to the UN, some $352 billion in drug profits had been absorbed into the western financial system, including through the US’ largest banks in 2009. As a result, Scott said the “United States involvement in the international drug traffic links the CIA, major financial interests, and criminal interests in this country and abroad.”

In 2012, the Daily Mail reported that HSBC, Britain’s biggest bank, faced up to £640million in penalties for allowing “rogue states and drugs cartels to launder billions of pounds through its branches,” and for becoming “a conduit for criminal enterprises.”

The billions in profits flowing from the Afghan heroin trade into western banks have now been eliminated by the Taliban not once, but twice in the past two decades.

Taliban leader Mullah Omar’s pronouncement in July 2000 that poppy cultivation was “un-Islamic” was, therefore, a more likely cause of the US sanctions imposed in December of the same year, and of the US invasion of Afghanistan a year later, than was any US desire to apprehend Bin Laden and dismantle Al-Qaeda.

In March 2002, just six months after the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan, a journalist asked President Bush, “Where’s Osama bin Laden?” Bush replied, ‘I don’t know. I don’t really think about him very much. I’m not that concerned.”

The Afghan drug trade serves as a stark reminder of the intricate connections between geopolitics, illicit economies, and global finance, and the need for greater transparency and accountability in addressing these complex issues.

The historical evidence also challenges the simplistic narrative that the Taliban largely controlled the Afghan drug trade, highlighting the dominant role played by the US-backed Afghan government and its allies in the CIA.
 
Last edited:
  • Like
Reactions: BrawlMan