Copyright Lawyers Sue Lawyer Who Helped Copyright Defendants

[Atmos Duality]

Strangely, this case makes sense to me.
One lawyer has effectively dismantled the main weapons used by an anti-piracy crusade, and they would rather he stop. He hasn't broken the law, so they must attack him legally with a civil suit.

In a bizarre twist of fate, this series of events isn't fueled entirely by stupidity.

Personally, I'd find it amusing if this guy would also write a series of motions to quash the bullshit legalese in shrink-wrap licenses.

 

[JDKJ]

Strangely, this case makes sense to me.
One lawyer has effectively dismantled the main weapons used by an anti-piracy crusade, and they would rather he stop. He hasn't broken the law, so they must attack him legally with a civil suit.

In a bizarre twist of fate, this series of events isn't fueled entirely by stupidity.

Personally, I'd find it amusing if this guy would also write a series of motions to quash the bullshit legalese in shrink-wrap licenses.

Agreed. It isn't at all fueled by stupidity. There's much method to the seeming madness.

Besides, it reflects a general opposition among many legal professionals to those who make legal forms available to the public at low cost. There was a time in which it was possible to buy simple legal forms (e.g., estate wills, power of attorney grants, landlord-tenant agreements, etc.) at a local Walgreen's. Those times no longer exist in several states because several bar associations filed suit to prohibit those sales, successfully arguing that they amounted to the unauthorized and unlicensed practice of law. And if you're a member of one of those bar associations and in the business of drafting wills and landlord-tenant agreements, etc., at $1000 a pop, then I imagine you'd be fully behind the effort to stamp out self-help legal forms at $9.99 a pop. Bad for business.

 

[Gordon_4_v1legacy]

What do you call 10,000 lawyers at the bottom of the ocean?

A damn good start.

I wouldn't bother polluting the oceans with their villainy. Take them out to the Simpson Desert [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simpson_Desert/] in Australia, no one will ever know they are there.

And for added safety we can bury them.

 

[Kevonovitch]

honestly, if the plauge of creatures known as "lawyers" wasen't so abundant, we wouldent have stupid bullshit such as thus.

 

[Gigano]

So because it's more expensive to deal with people who know how to exercise their legal rights and procedural options, they want to sue for damages?

As someone who work at a volunteer organization providing free legal aid, I've got to say that if the article is correct this is one of the most gross and unjust lawsuits I've seen, and had it happened here I'm pretty sure the lawsuit would have been instantly dismissed, and the lawyer in question severely fined or disbarred for trying to deny the most basic legal rights to the opponent, and de facto attacking the very foundation of a due process and equal justice.

If they win this - and I cannot for a second believe they will, but should they - the American justice system officially has nothing to do with any sensible definition of justice.

 

[JDKJ]

So because it's more expensive to deal with people who know how to exercise their legal rights and procedural options, they want to sue for damages?

As someone who work at a volunteer organization providing free legal aid, I've got to say that if the article is correct this is one of the most gross and unjust lawsuits I've seen, and had it happened here I'm pretty sure the lawsuit would have been instantly dismissed, and the lawyer in question severely fined or disbarred for trying to deny the most basic legal rights to the opponent, and de facto attacking the very foundation of a due process and equal justice.

If they win this - and I cannot for a second believe they will, but should they - the American justice system officially has nothing to do with any sensible definition of justice.

Putting aside the fact that it's not technically a new lawsuit but, rather, a request that opposing parties and their counsel be sanctioned inserted into a preexisting lawsuit, if the facts as alleged are anywhere near true (which does seem to be the case in many important respects), then the request for sanctions isn't as bogus as you make it out to be.

For example, it appears that every motion filed in this case must, as a matter of required procedure, contain a statement describing the filer's attempts prior to filing to meet and discuss with the opposing parties or their counsel the possibility of settlement of the matter to which the filed motion is addressed. Not a bad idea, in that it requires litigants to make at least a good faith attempt to settle their own disputes before seeking the court's intervention in the matter. But if what is claimed is true, nowhere in the legal forms used as motions in this case is that statement contained. If this is true (and it's a claim so easily subject to verification that I can't imagine anyone making the claim if it wasn't in fact true), then the motions are in fact procedurally defective (and may illustrate the downside of reliance on a $19.99 legal form) and therefore the request for sanctions isn't at all without some merit.

EDIT: And if the filer has in fact failed to satisfy such a simple procedural requirement and resultingly has caused the opposing party to spend costs and attorney's fees in having to respond and point out to the filer and the court that the filed motion is obviously defective, then I'm not really seeing why the filer shouldn't have to suck up those costs and attorney's fees. Seems entirely fair to me. Why should I be the one to pay for the other guy's mistake?

 

[Gigano]

...
Putting aside the fact that it's not technically a new lawsuit but, rather, a request that opposing parties and their counsel be sanctioned inserted into a preexisting lawsuit, if the facts as alleged are anywhere near true (which does seem to be the case in many important respects), then the request for sanctions isn't as bogus as you make it out to be.

For example, it appears that every motion filed in this case must, as a matter of required procedure, contain a statement describing the filer's attempts to meet and discuss with the opposing parties or their counsel the possibility of settlement of the matter to which the filed motion is addressed. Not a bad idea, in that it requires litigants to make at least a good faith attempt to settle their own disputes before seeking the court's intervention in the matter. But if what is claimed is true, nowhere in the legal forms used as motions in this case is that statement contained. If this is true (and it's a claim so easily subject to verification that I can't imagine anyone making the claim if it wasn't in fact true), then the motions are in fact procedurally defective (and may illustrate the downside of reliance on a $19.99 legal form) and therefore the request for sanctions isn't at all without some merit.

I'd imagine that the documents in question held a blank box which could be filled out with the information required under the law, and a guide describing the requirement.

Of course, if the provided documents have no such option to adhere to legal requirements, and are thus inherently procedurally defective, then a question of culpability - for the lawyer who provided them - could arise; Though on principle I'd be concerned if you can/could raise your claim against the other party based in his choice of utilizing legal counselling - even bad legal counselling - as it could easily be seen as pressure to not seek out such council at all.

As it seems from the article (which understandably doesn't go much into details) that some motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction have carried through, there were apparently a reason and basis for seeking out said legal council. To sanction people for using what council they can afford I'd hold to be a dangerous path for any justice system to allow for, even if some of the provided documents had not been/were not up to par.

 

[JDKJ]

...
Putting aside the fact that it's not technically a new lawsuit but, rather, a request that opposing parties and their counsel be sanctioned inserted into a preexisting lawsuit, if the facts as alleged are anywhere near true (which does seem to be the case in many important respects), then the request for sanctions isn't as bogus as you make it out to be.

For example, it appears that every motion filed in this case must, as a matter of required procedure, contain a statement describing the filer's attempts to meet and discuss with the opposing parties or their counsel the possibility of settlement of the matter to which the filed motion is addressed. Not a bad idea, in that it requires litigants to make at least a good faith attempt to settle their own disputes before seeking the court's intervention in the matter. But if what is claimed is true, nowhere in the legal forms used as motions in this case is that statement contained. If this is true (and it's a claim so easily subject to verification that I can't imagine anyone making the claim if it wasn't in fact true), then the motions are in fact procedurally defective (and may illustrate the downside of reliance on a $19.99 legal form) and therefore the request for sanctions isn't at all without some merit.

I'd imagine that the documents in question held a blank box which could be filled out with the information required under the law, and a guide describing the requirement.

Of course, if the provided documents have no such option to adhere to legal requirements, and are thus inherently procedurally defective, then a question of culpability - for the lawyer who provided them - could arise; Though on principle I'd be concerned if you can/could raise your claim against the other party based in his choice of utilizing legal counselling - even bad legal counselling - as it could easily be seen as pressure to not seek out such council at all.

As it seems from the article (which understandably doesn't go much into details) that some motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction have carried through, there were apparently a reason and basis for seeking out said legal council. To sanction people for using what council they can afford I'd hold to be a dangerous path for any justice system to allow for, even if some of the provided documents had not been/were not up to par.

While the request for sanctions may, as an atmospheric matter, be ill-motivated, motivations don't count for anything. What matters is whether or not the filed motions were plainly defective and therefore frivolous. It could well be that the sanctions are being requested out of pure spite and malice but, as a legal matter, that's of no importance.

And your "culpability" issue is reflected in the request that sanctions be imposed on both the filer and the form seller. The former for filing a defective form motion and the latter for selling a defective form motion. They're both on the hook.

 

[Gigano]

...

While the request for sanctions may, as an atmospheric matter, be ill-motivated, motivations don't count for anything. What matters is whether or not the filed motions were plainly defective and therefore frivolous. It could well be that the sanctions are being requested out of pure spite and malice but, as a legal matter, that's of no importance.

And your "culpability" issue is reflected in the request that sanctions be imposed on both the filer and the form seller. The former for filing a defective form motion and the latter for selling a defective form motion. They're both on the hook.

I'd have hoped the system was not as formalistic as to not allow for the courts to weigh in other concerns on a given issue. While procedural rules must of course be quite formalistic in nature, there should be some room for interpretation in light of the purposes of the rules, and a wider assessment in regard to more principal and basic norms on which the system (should) rest.

No court should allow itself to be used as a tool for what - at the very least in layman appearances - amounts to little more than trolling the defendant, and the laws should allow courts to see that they are not by allowing a certain margin for interpretation or emergency brake clauses when more fundamental considerations in regard to justice should be included. Legalistic automatism seldom works to ensure justice, a wider more nuanced assessment of whether something is "frivolous" should be possible for the courts to undertake.

 

[Mechsoap]

oh the irony!

 

[karloss01]

talk about sore losers.

 

[JDKJ]

...

While the request for sanctions may, as an atmospheric matter, be ill-motivated, motivations don't count for anything. What matters is whether or not the filed motions were plainly defective and therefore frivolous. It could well be that the sanctions are being requested out of pure spite and malice but, as a legal matter, that's of no importance.

And your "culpability" issue is reflected in the request that sanctions be imposed on both the filer and the form seller. The former for filing a defective form motion and the latter for selling a defective form motion. They're both on the hook.

I'd have hoped the system was not as formalistic as to not allow for the courts to weigh in other concerns on a given issue. While procedural rules must of course be quite formalistic in nature, there should be some room for interpretation in light of the purposes of the rules, and a wider assessment in regard to more principal and basic norms on which the system (should) rest.

No court should allow itself to be used as a tool for what - at the very least in layman appearances - amounts to little more than trolling the defendant, and the laws should allow courts to see that they are not by allowing a certain margin for interpretation or emergency brake clauses when more fundamental considerations in regard to justice should be included. Legalistic automatism seldom works to ensure justice, a wider more nuanced assessment of whether something is "frivolous" should be possible for the courts to undertake.

I hear everything you're saying and on a philosophical level it does makes some sense. On a more practical level, if "spite and malice" were to be taking into consideration by the courts in making their decisions, then countless ex-wives wouldn't be getting their monthly checks from their ex-husbands delivered to the mailbox in front of his ex-house.

Some would argue that's a fair and just outcome but you can imagine how unpleasant all our lives would be if the spiteful and malicious ex-wives of the world were denied their monthly checks and mortgage-free homes.

EDIT: Think of a world populated by millions of snarly Nancy Graces screaming accusations of "Guilty! Guilty! Guilty!" and going on ad nauseam about how justice was not served. Not a pretty mental image, is it?

 

[Gigano]

...
I hear everything you're saying and on a philosophical level it does makes some sense. On a more practical level, if "spite and malice" were to be taking into consideration by the courts in making their decisions, then countless ex-wives wouldn't be getting their monthly checks from their ex-husbands delivered to the mailbox in front of his ex-house. Some would argue that's a fair and just outcome but you can imagine how unpleasant all our lives would be if the spiteful and malicious ex-wives of the world were denied their monthly checks and mortgage-free houses.

Hehe, true, but that would be about the entitlement to the civil claim arising from the contract of marriage, rather than whether sanctions should be imposed or how and by which norms culpability should be assessed in regard to compensation law. Contract law would generally allow for less margin on assessments than compensation law, given there's an original common will of the parties to interpret from, and the social and societal concerns attached to family law would provide weighty reasons that even bitchy husbands and wives get their share anyway.

It wasn't so much an opportunity for dismissal based in "spite and malice" in filing the claim I was aiming for, but more a wider and more nuanced assessment of the basis for the claim itself, with the inclusion of some broader concerns, and why perhaps such a claim should (as a point of departure) not be able to be made - with spite or no spite - due to hefty counter concerns on de facto denial of or a deterrent on equal access to the judicial system and legal advice.

Not that "filed out of spite and malice" couldn't weigh into the assessment of whether a claim for sanctions or compensation should be met (when clearly based in harassment rather than), it just isn't too important if there's an actual and valid reason for compensation. Which I'm disputing here, or at least arguing that the totality of conflicting reasons should weigh against it if the courts has a margin to evaluate it.

 

[JDKJ]

...
I hear everything you're saying and on a philosophical level it does makes some sense. On a more practical level, if "spite and malice" were to be taking into consideration by the courts in making their decisions, then countless ex-wives wouldn't be getting their monthly checks from their ex-husbands delivered to the mailbox in front of his ex-house. Some would argue that's a fair and just outcome but you can imagine how unpleasant all our lives would be if the spiteful and malicious ex-wives of the world were denied their monthly checks and mortgage-free houses.

Hehe, true, but that would be about the entitlement to the civil claim arising from the contract of marriage, rather than whether sanctions should be imposed or how and by which norms culpability should be assessed in regard to compensation law. Contract law would generally allow for less margin on assessments than compensation law, given there's an original common will of the parties to interpret from, and the social and societal concerns attached to family law would provide weighty reasons that even bitchy husbands and wives get their share anyway.

It wasn't so much an opportunity for dismissal based in "spite and malice" in filing the claim I was aiming for, but more a wider and more nuanced assessment of the basis for the claim itself, with the inclusion of some broader concerns, and why perhaps such a claim should (as a point of departure) not be able to be made - with spite or no spite - due to hefty counter concerns on de facto denial of or a deterrent on equal access to the judicial system and legal advice.

Not that "filed out of spite and malice" couldn't weigh into the assessment of whether a claim for sanctions or compensation should be met (when clearly based in harassment rather than), it just isn't too important if there's an actual and valid reason for compensation. Which I'm disputing here, or at least arguing that the totality of conflicting reasons should weigh against it if the courts has a margin to evaluate it.

double post

 

[JDKJ]

...
I hear everything you're saying and on a philosophical level it does makes some sense. On a more practical level, if "spite and malice" were to be taking into consideration by the courts in making their decisions, then countless ex-wives wouldn't be getting their monthly checks from their ex-husbands delivered to the mailbox in front of his ex-house. Some would argue that's a fair and just outcome but you can imagine how unpleasant all our lives would be if the spiteful and malicious ex-wives of the world were denied their monthly checks and mortgage-free houses.

Hehe, true, but that would be about the entitlement to the civil claim arising from the contract of marriage, rather than whether sanctions should be imposed or how and by which norms culpability should be assessed in regard to compensation law. Contract law would generally allow for less margin on assessments than compensation law, given there's an original common will of the parties to interpret from, and the social and societal concerns attached to family law would provide weighty reasons that even bitchy husbands and wives get their share anyway.

It wasn't so much an opportunity for dismissal based in "spite and malice" in filing the claim I was aiming for, but more a wider and more nuanced assessment of the basis for the claim itself, with the inclusion of some broader concerns, and why perhaps such a claim should (as a point of departure) not be able to be made - with spite or no spite - due to hefty counter concerns on de facto denial of or a deterrent on equal access to the judicial system and legal advice.

Not that "filed out of spite and malice" couldn't weigh into the assessment of whether a claim for sanctions or compensation should be met (when clearly based in harassment rather than), it just isn't too important if there's an actual and valid reason for compensation. Which I'm disputing here, or at least arguing that the totality of conflicting reasons should weigh against it if the courts has a margin to evaluate it.

But think of the analytical quagmire into which you're suggesting the Court should have to wade. To cite but one example among many, how is the Court to determine those litigant who are too poor to afford the services of an actual attorney and those who are simply too cheap to do so? Should they have to request and review financial disclosures in order to rule on a simple procedural motion? They'd never get much real work done going that route.

 

[Gigano]

...
But think of the analytical quagmire into which you're suggesting the Court should have to wade. To cite but one example among many, how is the Court to determine those litigant who are too poor to afford the services of an actual attorney and those who are simply too cheap to do so? Should they have to request and review financial disclosures in order to rule on a simple procedural motion? They'd never get much real work going that route.

I'm not much for the whole sanctioning and damages due to procedural missteps in the first place, that should be settled when awarding/splitting costs - again assigned as part of a total assessment on who won the case, how obvious was it, what did they win compared to their claim (i.e. was the claim frivolous or unreasonable in nature?) etc.

But if such an institution is in place then you could operate with a main rule that faulty processing which lead to increased costs for the other party should (or should not, as I'd prefer) give rise to claims, with an emergency brake clause that the court - ex officio - could choose not to award them if obvious imbalances between the parties - the problem here - or other reasons pertinent to maintaining an equal opportunity for a due process (present on either side) warranted it.

An obvious imbalance between the parties should be considerably easier and informal to ascertain than fixed minimum requirements, would work in most plausible scenarios, and should the copyright violator be an obvious millionaire, the court can choose to award damages regardless.

Of course American common law and European continental law are quite different, so such things might be alien or unsuited for the American system as a whole, with other guarantees being more suitable.

 

[JDKJ]

...
But think of the analytical quagmire into which you're suggesting the Court should have to wade. To cite but one example among many, how is the Court to determine those litigant who are too poor to afford the services of an actual attorney and those who are simply too cheap to do so? Should they have to request and review financial disclosures in order to rule on a simple procedural motion? They'd never get much real work going that route.

I'm not much for the whole sanctioning and damages due to procedural missteps in the first place, that should be settled when awarding/splitting costs - again assigned as part of a total assessment on who won, what did they win compared to their claim (i.e. was the claim frivolous or unreasonable in nature?) etc.

But if such an institution is in place then you could operate with a main rule that faulty processing which lead to increased costs for the other party should (or should not, as I'd prefer) give rise to claims, with an emergency brake clause that the court - ex officio - could choose not to award them if obvious imbalances between the parties - the problem here - or other reasons pertinent to maintaining an equal opportunity for a due process (present on either side) warranted it.

An obvious imbalance between the parties should be considerably easier and informal to ascertain than fixed minimum requirements, would work in most plausible scenarios, and should the copyright violator be an obvious millionaire, the court can choose to award damages regardless.

Of course American common law and European continental law are quite different, so such things might be alien or unsuited for the American system as a whole, with other guarantees being more suitable.

But I'm not seeing where the imbalance in legal representation is obviously attributable to an imbalance of financial resources. Again, how are we to confidently conclude that the reason the defendant in this case was relying on a $20 package of legal forms and not retaining actual counsel was because they didn't have the financial resources to retain an actual counsel? They could just as easily be rolling in money but just too frickin' cheap to shell out for a real counsel. If so, any imbalance of legal representation that exists is of their own making. Why should the Court take that self-created imbalance under consideration? And if it isn't self-created, how does the Court determine that fact? By wading into a factual quagmire?

Also, think of the prejudicial effect of litigants being able to place their financial worth or lack thereof before the Court in cases where financial worth would normally play no role. "I'm flat ass broke and don't have a pot to piss in or a window to throw it out" should be a valid defense only to a greedy wife in a divorce proceeding (just kidding . . . kinda).

 

[Gigano]

...

But I'm not seeing where the imbalance in legal representation is obviously attributable to an imbalance of financial resources. Again, how are we to confidently conclude that the reason the defendant in this case was relying on a $20 package of legal forms and not retaining actual counsel was because they didn't have the financial resources to retain an actual counsel? They could just as easily be rolling in money but just too frickin' cheap to shell out for a real counsel. If so, any imbalance of legal representation that exists is of their own making. Why should the Court take that self-created imbalance under consideration? And if it isn't self-created, how does the Court determine that fact? By wading into a factual quagmire?

I'd hope that a judge have the common sense be able to take a look at the 20 year old in slacks with the reverse baseball cap sitting before him, take a gander at the list of companies the copyright lawyer represent, and conclude that there's probably an obvious imbalance in the quality and quantity of the legal council they can afford.

 

[JDKJ]

...

But I'm not seeing where the imbalance in legal representation is obviously attributable to an imbalance of financial resources. Again, how are we to confidently conclude that the reason the defendant in this case was relying on a $20 package of legal forms and not retaining actual counsel was because they didn't have the financial resources to retain an actual counsel? They could just as easily be rolling in money but just too frickin' cheap to shell out for a real counsel. If so, any imbalance of legal representation that exists is of their own making. Why should the Court take that self-created imbalance under consideration? And if it isn't self-created, how does the Court determine that fact? By wading into a factual quagmire?

I'd hope that a judge have the common sense be able to take a look at the 20 year old in slacks with the reverse baseball cap sitting before him, take a gander at the list of companies the copyright lawyer represent, and conclude that there's probably an obvious imbalance in the quality and quantity of the legal council they can afford.

Ever heard of a Trustafarian? Trustafarians are these college-age kids who hang out in New York's Lower East Side and Greenwich Village, never cut or comb their hair, wear tatty clothes and worn-out sneakers, smoke copious amounts of skunky buds all day while listening to Bob Marley, and, when not smoking skunky buds, can usually be found riding a skateboard. To look at a Trustafarian, you'd automatically conclude that they're as poor as a church mouse. Wrong. Trustafarians have parents who work on Wall Street as investment bankers and make a gazillion dollars a year and have been kind enough to set up trust funds for their ne'er-do-well children and which finance the bohemian lifestyle of the Trustafarian (hence the "Trust" in "Trustafarian"). If a Trustafarian so chooses, they are independently wealthy enough (thanks to said trust fund) to wear Armani suits every day and drive a Mercedes Benz. Things are rarely what they appear to be.

 

[Gigano]

...
Ever heard of a Trustafarian? Trustafarians are these college-age kids who hang out in New York's Lower East Side and Greenwich Village, never cut or comb their hair, wear tatty clothes and worn-out sneakers, smoke copious amounts of skunky buds all day while listening to Bob Marley, and, when not smoking skunky bud, can usually be found riding a skateboard. To look at a Trustafarian, you'd automatically conclude that they're as poor as a church mouse. Wrong. Trustafarians have parents who work on Wall Street as investment bankers and make a gazillion dollars a year and have been kind enough to set up trust funds for the ne'er-do-well children and which finance the bohemian lifestyle of the Trustafarian (hence the "Trust" in "Trustafarian"). If a Trustafarian so chooses, they are independently wealthy enough (thanks to said trust fund) to wear Armani suits every day and drive a Mercedes Benz. Things are rarely what they appear to be.

If so, then the copyright attorneys who have their names and info should enlighten the judge about that fact, clearing out the general advance assumption - which would hold true in most cases - that the companies are significantly more capable in all respects than the defendant in this type of case.

If no quarter is given, and trying to exercise your complex legal rights might ruin you, then the system may not be played by miserly defendants, but it will for all practical purposes be played by wealthy clients who can afford copious legal council and repression of the other party's access. All justice systems are of course inevitably slanted towards those who can afford the best legal aid, but given the whole justice thing such advantages should be minimized as much as possible.