Or as somebody once famously worded it after his assassination attempt failed: "They have to get lucky every time, we have to get lucky just once".Eclectic Dreck said:It turns out that it is simply easier to poke a hole in something than it is to keep it from happening.
Public opinion always was a powerful influence on war, but since the Vietnam war one thing quite dramatically changed: whether you're winning the war on the field is almost irrelevant. Technically both Vietnam and Afghanistan are soundly being won, but in both cases the war for public opinion is being lost as the enemy just won't stop fighting.Eclectic Dreck said:Public opinion didn't stop the deployments from happening in the first place. Public opinion did not save the lives of an estimated 1 million Iraqi citizens. Sure, public opinion will eventually end this war just as public opinion ended countless other conflicts before the age of the internet. But I would point out that manipulating the opinion of the masses is something people do on both sides of the equation.Kargathia said:You're still thinking one step behind reality right now. The problem is not how fast you can get your toys around, the problem is that in the internet age Clausewitz is more viable than ever.
They don't need to win their war on the battlefield when the weakest part of the US military is public opinion.
And, while I do not often agree with using military power to resolve a problem (a realization I came to after being in the military), I can recognize the value of having a more mobile force. Better to show up in a week with a division of strykers than in a month with a division of Abrams. The fundamental problem that was "solved" by the Stryker was simply that there was no middle ground between heavy units (Armor and Mechanized infantry) and light units (light infantry such as airborne units). What you could get in a hurry wasn't much in the grand scheme of things and the big things take a long time to show up. Thus why there was a months long buildup in the middle east before the first gulf war and this second attempt (though there were political reasons that exacerbated the first).
But to get closer to the original topic: there is quite a bit of an analogy between the development of the Stryker, and the role of cavalry in late medieval times, and all the way up to the Napoleontic wars.
The closest equivalent would be that of the lancers, who quite successfully traded the protection armor offered for mobility, speed, and economic effectivity.