BrotherRool said:
I guess, but then how are we worshipping the same thing when what we're doing is contradictory? Because if you remove the the things contradictory things that christians and muslims worship too, then they really aren't worshipping rather than worshipping to the same thing.
Okay, let me put it this way, the fact that religious doctrines contradict each other could generally mean three things : 1) that one doctrine is the correct one and is literally true in all of its aspects, 2) the doctrines could each be partially true, or 3) each doctrine is a kind of indirect or metaphorical representation of the truth and since one can use multiple, seemingly contradictory metaphors to describe the same thing, they are consistent with one another. (I am of course simplifying things a bit because there could be shades in between these options.)
Since you're already committed to the idea that Christian religious doctrine is the literal truth you've already dismissed the other two possibilities. But you can't cite that as evidence that the other two options are false without begging the very question at hand. It boils down to faith, which isn't a bad thing, but it can't be used as an argument.
BrotherRool said:
I don't know, but I would say yes, because if you are fully aware of everything happening at all points in time then the purpose of an imperfect recollection of what you can see and interact with clearly seems pointless. But in the end I don't think it's possible to fully understand what God is.
Both of those points are perfectly reasonable. But if you grant the latter point that would seem to open up some doubts about Biblical literalism. Given that human understanding is finite and imperfect it might be reasonable to assume that God would only reveal himself to us in ways that we are capable of understanding. That wouldn't make the Bible
untrue, it just might mean that it isn't
transcendentally true, or the truth
as God himself understands it. The old Catholic doctrine was essentially that there are different levels at which people can understand the Bible, and so the priests were needed to interpret it for people. Of course, part of that might simply be a power-play on behalf of the church, but it seems at least plausible. As I said before, if God wants you to love him, it seems reasonable that he would also want you to think about him deeply, and that he could embed multiple levels of truth in his work to reward those who do.
BrotherRool said:
Now it's my time to recommend a book, Flatland the maths book, makes it clear that a three dimensional object would have no problems interacting with a two dimensional one, just that the laws of the universe that the two dimensional objects see would make seem to be broken with ease. We do it every day, every second because when I move my hand I've interfered with infinitely many two dimensional planes. The dimensions I do it in, are simply the dimensions of the two dimensional plane I'm doing it in. Lots of maths involves different dimensional things affecting each other, technically economics is absolutely full of fit.
I'm generally aware of the math, e.g. mobius strips and the like. But I don't think that a two dimensional object can
causally interact with a three dimensional object. What you've described isn't a causal interaction because the two dimensional planes aren't real physical objects in the proper sense; they are mathematical descriptions of the surface areas etc. of real three dimensional objects.
For causal interaction proper you need two distinct objects, but the two-dimensional object is really just an aspect of the three dimensional object. When a rubber ball hits a brick wall you can describe the effect the brick wall has on the surface area of the ball
qua two dimensional plane, but that's just a mathematical description of an aspect of a real physical three-dimensional object. A
true two dimensional object would have no mass. You get what I'm saying? I'm not saying the math is wrong, I'm just saying it's a mathematical description of 'interaction' and not a causal, physical description. It would probably be more apt to say that the two-dimensional surface area of the ball supervenes upon/emerges out of/reduces to the three dimensional ball than to say that the three-dimensional ball
causes its two-dimensional surface area. The latter is ontologically dependent upon the former.
So let's apply this to God. I'm not denying that God would have an effect on time, quite the contrary, God would be the existential basis for time itself, such that time could not exist without God. But God couldn't act
in time as a non-temporal entity. You could say that Jesus, as God in temporal form (putting aside any problems with that idea), could act in time. Obviously he did. But from God's non-temporal perspective Jesus' actions were part of the entire temporal order that was, for lack of a better term, created 'instantaneously'. The temporal order emerges out of God in a non-temporal way, so he couldn't "change" the temporal order. Well, I suppose you could grant that God exists in his own temporal order that is separate from ours, but that implies a lot of crazy things. And even if he did, a change from his perspective would recreate our entire reality such that it would have always been that way.
BrotherRool said:
ReiverCorrupter said:
That's true, but then that also implies that the thing that needs changing never happened because it was created in perfect form. But he can still create things that change because a change in weather for instance is no sign of change in imperfection and it can be part of a perfect plan that things change.
Yes, I totally agree. I was never claiming that God couldn't create things that change, just that he couldn't be said to change himself.
BrotherRool said:
I don't have this predestination problem that you mention either.
Oh, I remember. I wasn't suggesting that it was a problem, I was just noting that it was a necessary implication of the view. I'm not going to debate free will in the strong metaphysical sense because I don't really believe in it either. Most philosophers these days hold some form of compatibilism.
BrotherRool said:
See I don't agree and I think the fundamental definition of God is that he thinks,
Well, that's an argument ender. If that's what you think then there isn't much more to say on the topic. But at least allow me to draw out some possible objections to the rest of what you said for your consideration:
BrotherRool said:
if he doesn't then he's a thing.
Well, I think that's a false binary. I think I understand what you're getting at, but I would say that 'things' are more generally defined as non-conscious, and it isn't exactly clear to me that one has to think in order to be conscious. Of course, part of what is at issue is how you define the term 'think'. If by 'think' you mean "entertain propositions", then animals don't really think. Thinking in that sense requires language. But I would still say that animals are conscious and that they aren't things. I suppose you could make the old argument that animals don't have souls and that they are therefore things. Personally I find that a bit reprehensible, but to each his own I suppose. But even granting that, there are plenty of other things aside from thoughts of which you can have conscious awareness, e.g. feelings such as anger, sadness, happiness, etc. The point is that I think you can grant that God is conscious without saying that he thinks, and that would be enough to distinguish him from a thing.
BrotherRool said:
And just because it doesn't come easy to mind what form that thinking would take doesn't make it less probable. You're fixed on time but if we took a human thought say 'I want to pick up that bowl' and if I thought it twice as quickly the nature of that thought wouldn't change, and if I thought it twice as quickly again still that thought would change. And so if I were to take that to infinity I could have that thought instantaneously and it wouldn't change the thought.
That isn't really the problem. The problem is thinking two
contradictory things at the same time. Furthermore, propositional thoughts are by their very nature limited. If God only thought one thing at a time like we do, this would not only imply that he is temporal (which we have already dealt with); it would also make him finite. It also seems to imply that God is constrained by language, which seems objectionable. And what about propositions that express temporal copulas? Can God think "I will do this" if he is outside of time? Can God entertain false propositions?
BrotherRool said:
We even still have the divider of action because in every instant God perfectly can see every possible type of pattern and universe but he only has to will to exist those that he chooses.
Well that takes us back to the temporal problems. But putting that aside, you bring up an interesting point. Kant argues that knowledge through representation is necessarily imperfect because it separates the mental representation from the object it represents. He suggests that God does not represent reality as the object of his thought, but
creates reality by thinking so that representation and object are one-and-the-same. So for God thought and will are one-and-the-same as well.
BrotherRool said:
And God wouldn't have to think every thought to be perfect in fact as you pointed out far from it, he'd just have to be able to conceive the _notion_ of every thought.
What do you mean by "_notion_ of every thought"? Isn't the notion of every thought just the notion, "every thought", i.e. the notion of a class that is defined as including every thought? Even if there are thoughts that are inconceivable to us, we are still able to conceive the notion of "every thought". The notion, "every thought" is pretty simple. I've already used it several times in this paragraph. That seems like a pretty low standard for perfection. What I think you're suggesting is that the notion of "every thought" is not just the vague notion of a class defined as containing all thoughts. You seem to be suggesting that the "notion of every thought" is a notion that actually includes the content of all possible thoughts, which would certainly be impossible for humans. But how would that be different from thinking every thought?
BrotherRool said:
Yes these are cool questions!
Yup.
BrotherRool said:
ReiverCorrupter said:
No, no, no. A student should never accept what a teacher says as true if he doesn't understand it. He should accept that he doesn't understand it and that for practical reasons it's probably best to act as if what the teacher is true. But that is very different from accepting it as true. If someone wants to really establish the truth of something for themselves, then they have to work to understand it.
Hmm, I think that's true in cases but not a concept that can be applied. I guess you would be putting people in the situation where they can have truth or they can search for it but not both. There are true things I know that my Dad can never know, because he isn't that good at maths. Even if he did his best to understand it he'd probably not succeed and is more likely to draw an incorrect conclusion from getting things wrong. Whilst you shouldn't stop searching for truth, if you can trust the someone has some then I think sometimes to know the truth you have to take what you've been given.
So first off, I agree that it is often completely impractical to deny something because you don't fully understand it. I don't fully understand the way gravity works but you don't see me bolting myself to the floor. What I'm saying is that you don't have knowledge of something unless you understand it, and that if you really want to say that you
know the truth then you can't settle for authoritative testimony.
So how does one possess the truth? Through knowledge, right? Well can someone have substantive knowledge of something without understanding it? The truth is the truth, and any given proposition is true or false regardless of whether we know it to be so. What I'm talking about is knowledge. So say I believe that the following sentence is true: "Einstein's theory of relativity is true." And now say that Einstein's theory of relativity is true. Now say that I have never read Einstein's theory of relativity. Do I know Einstein's theory of relativity? No, obviously not because I haven't read it. Do I know Einstein's theory of relativity to be true? If yes, then am I as justified in believing that Einstein's theory of relativity is true as an astrophysicist? If the answer is again yes, then it seems that knowledge is independent of understanding. So what if I say that I believe some sentence in Chinese is true and I don't speak a lick of Chinese and I don't understand the sentence? If the sentence happens to be true then I would know it to be true, even though I have no idea what it says. Knowledge isn't just true belief, it's true
justified belief.
Of course, what you're suggesting is that authoritative testimony is enough to justify a belief and give one knowledge. That's obviously more reasonable, but I don't think authoritative testimony gives you knowledge of the subject matter that is being testified because your justification is not based in an understanding of the subject matter. It's based in your trust for the authority figure. That is more than enough justification to go about your daily activities, but it simply doesn't give you knowledge of the material. Even if it turns out that what the authority figure says is true, all this would mean is that you know the authority figure to be trustworthy. In the Einstein example above, say that I believe in relativity because an astrophysicist friend told me it was true, and that I am justified in believing his testimony. What would this entail? How useful would my 'knowledge' of relativity be if I didn't understand it at all? If my friend just told me this so that I wouldn't have to worry about suddenly flying up into the air, then it's probably enough.