The Democratic Primary is Upon Us! - Biden is the Presumptive Nominee

[Silvanus]

Was my writing in any conceivable way ambiguous?

Comparative petroleum scarcity and cost during the energy crisis contributed to the continued proliferation and use of ozone-depleting chemicals less-reliant on petroleum-based precursors, and when that scarcity was alleviated by the end of the energy crisis the transition was to cheaper, safer, and easier to manufacture products. This would be why halocarbon replacements are hydrocarbons. Which is why the "sanctions" in the Montreal Protocol -- such as they were, pointless -- never "had" to be evoked.

The Montreal Protocol was smoke and mirrors, a nominally-binding resolution absent meaningful consequences for offending states, a lesson we should have taken to heart when it was discovered last year China was breaking the protocol on the down-low and nothing has been done, and the US has been fracking for over a decade with zero fucks given by anyone outside the environmental lobby. Hence why, despite headlines, ozone repletion is and remains stunted. It's a "feel good" letter designed to quiet discontent, not fix problems.

The idea that the Montreal Protocal was so ineffective is utterly at odds with scientific opinion [https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms8233]. Use of CFCs measurably declined, and atmospheric concentrations measurably declined along with them. If you're going to ascribe that to the Invisible Hand of the market simply following the timeline of the energy crisis, I'm calling bullshit; not least because the timeline doesn't even match up, with petroleum at a significantly lower cost as early as 1986.

Hell, at the time, companies were insisting that no alternatives to HFC for refrigeration existed; it took NGOs developing them and freeing the patents to force their hand (doing so, note, out of environmental concern).

Naw, if we're going to contradict the vast scientific consensus, then you're going to need citations from journals or analyses or something, not just your own amateur sleuthing.

This is why you should actually be talking to conservatives, not banging your head against what your perception of conservatives is. Petrodollars is out of the popular lexicon; conservatives can and do still care about it, albeit through the post-9/11 filter of radical Islamist terror. Itself a popular topic of wokescolding and polarization by way of "Islamophobia" or just straight "racism", as a convenient well-poisoning strategy to prevent meaningful discussion on a topic.

For example, know how any and all criticism of Israeli policy and Israel's role in the Israel-Palestine conflict is quickly and mercilessly shouted down as antisemitism by the Zionist right and left? Know how annoying that is? Same shit; just because your side employs the strategy, whilst oil companies benefit (and they do), doesn't make it correct, necessary, proper, or really anything but useful idiocy to toxic interests.

Which is my point: the left's entire regime for climate change debate is a top-down state of controlled opposition and useful idiocy of, by, and for the fossil fuels industry. Head-banging against a firewall, using decades-old and well-countered talking points by rote, indoctrinated to the point of refusing to understand their designed-to-fail nature, nor the irony of continuing to play by a book dictated in no small part by the fossil fuels industry itself. What I'm saying, is stop being a goddamn useful idiot.

The thing is, I do talk to conservatives (and read their press). Perhaps this is something to do with the difference between US and UK political parlance, but I've never even seen or heard the term "petrodollars" outside of internet forums.

You can characterise it however you like. But the fact is that even the conservatives in most European countries are now under pressure to adjust policy to environmental concerns, and reductions have been baked into both manifestos and law. The pace of this progress is grindingly, painfully, dangerously slow, but it's literally the only movement in the right direction that we've seen.

On the other hand, this purely financial "petrodollars" argument has achieved precisely nothing.

Perhaps you might read again what you just wrote.

I've read it. Nothing in that list actually said what you said it did, and this is just deflection.

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

The idea that the Montreal Protocal was so ineffective is utterly at odds with scientific opinion [https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms8233]. Use of CFCs measurably declined, and atmospheric concentrations measurably declined along with them...

I'ma go ahead, stop you here, and point out the article you cited has a number of unsubstantiated, and unsubstantiatable, assumptions:

1. Its contrast is against an hypothetical "no other action" model which assumes anthropogenic ozone depletion would not only have continued, but continued increasing along the 1964-1980 trajectory of peak increase. Its only point of contention with other studies was methodology.

2. Reduction in ozone-depleting substance use is only attributable to the Montreal Protocol in opposition to other (for example, economic) factors, making it a case example of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning.

Not only does that fail to be a counter to my own argument, it more or less lays bare the foundation of my argument: the argument is based upon flawed, biased, premises that fail to account for any alternative explanation in favor of a predetermined narrative. That doesn't prove the Montreal Protocol worked as intended, it simply assumes it did and contrasts it against a worst-case scenario with no other assumptions.

...I'm calling bullshit; not least because the timeline doesn't even match up, with petroleum at a significantly lower cost as early as 1986.

You mean it might take time for chemical-producing companies to transition production from halocarbon production to hydrocarbon production? Come on now, even the most ardent defenders of the Montreal Protocol are going to concede this first and foremost, least of all for the agreement's phase-out period. This, if anything, is by far the most bizarre of your points given the MP was finalized in '87 and took effect in '89; this assumption would indicate a borderline-sorcerous effectiveness in market transition on chemical companies' part.

Hell, at the time, companies were insisting that no alternatives to HFC for refrigeration existed; it took NGOs developing them and freeing the patents to force their hand (doing so, note, out of environmental concern).

Hydrofluorocarbons were what replaced chlorofluorocarbons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons in the late '80s and early '90s. They weren't even regulated until the 2016 Kigali Amendment, which only came into effect in 2019. Then, because they are not an ODS, but rather a greenhouse gas which indirectly contributes to ozone depletion by way of global warming, an interaction not properly studied until the 2010's.

A side note, CFC's became refrigerant chemicals of choice to replace their toxic predecessors: ammonia, methyl chloride, and sulfur dioxide. "No alternatives" my ass; since the Kigali Amendment's introduction, there has been renewed interest in ammonia as a commercial refrigerant.

Naw, if we're going to contradict the vast scientific consensus, then you're going to need citations from journals or analyses or something, not just your own amateur sleuthing.

Try to get your basic facts straight, then we'll talk.

The thing is, I do talk to conservatives (and read their press). Perhaps this is something to do with the difference between US and UK political parlance, but I've never even seen or heard the term "petrodollars" outside of internet forums.

I'm sure it does; it was a topic of major concern in the '80s, and for good reason sandwiched between the Cold War and energy crisis. I grew up hearing the term on practically every program from Firing Line with William F. Buckley and MacNeil/Lehrer Report, to daytime television. My first memory of the term was on a soap opera. I was a weird fucking kid.

The death of the term wasn't the 2003 Iraq invasion, but rather the collapse of the Soviet Union (and temporary demise of the Russian fossil fuels industry) and OPEC ascendancy on the global oil market, and the intersection and capstone of both, the first Gulf War. The half of that story you don't hear was Iraq had casus belli and the US-led coalition lacked casus foederis, and was acting as a mercenary force to unjustly defend the theft of Iraqi oil.

On the other hand, this purely financial "petrodollars" argument has achieved precisely nothing.

Funny enough, approaching fossil fuels reduction from a national security perspective was exactly what Obama attempted. His chief enemy in reframing the debate was the left.

Nothing in that list actually said what you said it did, and this is just deflection.

No, you're just trying to pretend the wokescolding you admit was part of those articles, doesn't matter because they hypocritically also called out the hazards of wet markets. Which was my entire point to begin with, both sides are right for all the wrong reasons.

 

[tstorm823]

Naw, if we're going to contradict the vast scientific consensus, then you're going to need citations from journals or analyses or something, not just your own amateur sleuthing.

I want you to know, this hurt me personally.

 

[Seanchaidh]

[tweet t="https://twitter.com/krystalball/status/1245775832938958848"]

Guess we're not going to hear word one about Tara Reade on the big news channels until the primary is over?

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

Guess we're not going to hear word one about Tara Reade on the big news channels until the primary is over?

The entire reason there's even heavier pressure on Bernie to drop out than before, is because the Democratic party has systemically shit the bed on each and every salient issue of the past ten years in one election cycle alone, and as long as Bernie's in they can't bait-and-switch out Biden for another candidate who never would have beaten Bernie in a straightforward race.

 

[Silvanus]

I'ma go ahead, stop you here, and point out the article you cited has a number of unsubstantiated, and unsubstantiatable, assumptions:

1. Its contrast is against an hypothetical "no other action" model which assumes anthropogenic ozone depletion would not only have continued, but continued increasing along the 1964-1980 trajectory of peak increase. Its only point of contention with other studies was methodology.

2. Reduction in ozone-depleting substance use is only attributable to the Montreal Protocol in opposition to other (for example, economic) factors, making it a case example of post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning.

Not only does that fail to be a counter to my own argument, it more or less lays bare the foundation of my argument: the argument is based upon flawed, biased, premises that fail to account for any alternative explanation in favor of a predetermined narrative. That doesn't prove the Montreal Protocol worked as intended, it simply assumes it did and contrasts it against a worst-case scenario with no other assumptions.

Comparing reductions against a hypothetical continuation of the existing trajectory is... pretty damn standard procedure. To be frank, it's not the role of a scientific analysis to offer complete speculation about possible other causes of the reduction.

You mean it might take time for chemical-producing companies to transition production from halocarbon production to hydrocarbon production? Come on now, even the most ardent defenders of the Montreal Protocol are going to concede this first and foremost, least of all for the agreement's phase-out period. This, if anything, is by far the most bizarre of your points given the MP was finalized in '87 and took effect in '89; this assumption would indicate a borderline-sorcerous effectiveness in market transition on chemical companies' part.

Yeah, that, or just simple planning in advance. Do you imagine that manufacturing companies would wait several years for the market to catch up to technology before they consider purchasing costs?

Hydrofluorocarbons were what replaced chlorofluorocarbons and hydrochlorofluorocarbons in the late '80s and early '90s. They weren't even regulated until the 2016 Kigali Amendment, which only came into effect in 2019. Then, because they are not an ODS, but rather a greenhouse gas which indirectly contributes to ozone depletion by way of global warming, an interaction not properly studied until the 2010's.

A side note, CFC's became refrigerant chemicals of choice to replace their toxic predecessors: ammonia, methyl chloride, and sulfur dioxide. "No alternatives" my ass; since the Kigali Amendment's introduction, there has been renewed interest in ammonia as a commercial refrigerant.

All of which shows up the industry's unwillingness to shift to be exactly what it was: sheer intransigence. To expect market forces to speedily shift this industry onto cleaner alternatives and solve the ozone problem without external protocols forcing them to do so is rank optimism (and, if I can nick a phrase: a belief in "borderline-sorcerous effectiveness" on the part of the invisible hand of the market).

Try to get your basic facts straight, then we'll talk.

Get anything other than sheer speculation, and there'll be something to talk about. All you've given is your own little narrative, built on correlation and very little else.

Funny enough, approaching fossil fuels reduction from a national security perspective was exactly what Obama attempted. His chief enemy in reframing the debate was the left.

That's a shame. Still waiting for an example of that argument being efficacious in bringing about any change at all, though.

No, you're just trying to pretend the wokescolding you admit was part of those articles, doesn't matter because they hypocritically also called out the hazards of wet markets. Which was my entire point to begin with, both sides are right for all the wrong reasons.

Uhrm, we weren't talking about "wokescolding" in general, and I don't have any interest in getting into some bullshit wider culture-war nonsense.

You claimed, quite specifically, that merely criticising wet markets at all invited accusations of "racism". Those articles simply do not say that at all, not one of them. Don't try to broaden this point out: the claim was false.

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

Comparing reductions against a hypothetical continuation of the existing trajectory is... pretty damn standard procedure. To be frank, it's not the role of a scientific analysis to offer complete speculation about possible other causes of the reduction.

Note I said "1964-1980". I did so for a reason, because the next, logical question is "what about 1980-1989?". Or, more to the point, "what about 1964-1989?".

Source: EEC.

Source: ESA.

You might ask yourself, "what happened between 1973-1985?". But more to the point, year-over-year CFC and HCFC production was already slowing, even accounting for the energy crisis and its subsequent resolution, indicating an approach towards peak production long before the Montreal Protocol.

This is why basing an exponential growth model off peak year-over-year increase without consideration for any other intervening variable, like for example a global energy crisis retarding CFC and HCFC production for over a decade followed by a shallower production curve than prior, is really dumb. But here's the money shot:

Given that it takes approximately 10-20 years for CFC emissions to have an impact on ozone depletion (5-7 years to reach the ozone layer, another 5-15 to degrade and deplete O3 if memory serves), the "great immediate success" of the Montreal Protocol is...being incorrectly credited for the impact of the energy crisis.

This is why studies, charts, facts, and figures are generally split into two categories: 1964-1980, and 1980-1989. Only show Scary Line go up, except when Good Thing must be shown causing Scary Line go down.

Yeah, that, or just simple planning in advance. Do you imagine that manufacturing companies would wait several years for the market to catch up to technology before they consider purchasing costs?

You tell me. You're the one arguing the chemical industry would manage to transition its entire production regime, specific to the US in a post-Chevron regulatory climate, just because the UN asked nicely, in a shorter and more costly time frame.

To expect market forces to speedily shift this industry onto cleaner alternatives and solve the ozone problem without external protocols forcing them to do so is rank optimism (and, if I can nick a phrase: a belief in "borderline-sorcerous effectiveness" on the part of the invisible hand of the market).

You might want to take a second look at those charts I posted up there.

Get anything other than sheer speculation, and there'll be something to talk about. All you've given is your own little narrative, built on correlation and very little else.

Being that approximately one of us seems to know the difference between a halocarbon and a hydrocarbon, in a conversation about the Montreal Protocol of all things, I'll take my own word, thanks.

That's a shame. Still waiting for an example of that argument being efficacious in bringing about any change at all, though.

Still waiting for an argument stamping your feet and holding your breath, in the face of a fossil fuels industry banking on your doing just that, will accomplish the same goal. Which is funny, because while you want to hold fast to really bad examples because that's what you've been told to parrot, I've given you three better examples -- the prohibition of TEL, the prohibition of DDT, and the acid rain program -- you might otherwise have used, which you're completely ignoring.

Which is why I consider "the left" at large to have zero credibility or authority to speak on any of these topics. The obsession with performance over substance could not possibly be clearer in this entire conversation.

You claimed, quite specifically, that merely criticising wet markets at all invited accusations of "racism". Those articles simply do not say that at all, not one of them. Don't try to broaden this point out: the claim was false.

My claim, quite specifically, was:

The right has been the faction to point to bushmeat consumption and unregulated wet markets, in the pursuit of what you (rightly) pointed out: scapegoating. The left has busied itself calling the right racist, and making appeals to cultural relativism, for it. "Both sides" are right, but for all the wrong reasons: global inequity, uneven distribution of wealth and resources, and cultural imperialism are a primary driver for bushmeat consumption and wet markets, and to a certain extent one state or culture ought not interfere in good faith, humane, and safe practices of others, but playing white savior to protect unsafe and inhumane practices does no good and neither does scapegoating.

This is as big a vindication of Marxist theory as one can get: social and economic elites are playing the right and left against one another to protect global economic inequality. Keep the useful idiots fighting over wet markets, rather than paying heed to why they exist in the form they do.

My goalpost is pointing out how the left is wokescolding the right over perceived racism, for criticizing wet markets. There is no "at all", there is one side hypocritically accusing the other of racism.

 

[Agema]

Given that it takes approximately 10-20 years for CFC emissions to have an impact on ozone depletion (5-7 years to reach the ozone layer, another 5-15 to degrade and deplete O3 if memory serves), the "great immediate success" of the Montreal Protocol is...being incorrectly credited for the impact of the energy crisis.

Nope. Those graphs are directly about halocarbon emissions, not ozone levels.

Emissions duly decreased sharply after the Montreal Protocol, as your graphs demonstrate. Ozone depletion (if we take the Antarctic "hole" as a proxy) seems to have slackened off in the mid-late 1990s with gradual signs of recovery beginning in the 2000s, consistent with that cut in CFC production at the end of the 1980s.

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

Nope. Those graphs are directly about halocarbon emissions, not ozone levels.

Yes, that's my entire point. CFC's and HCFC's don't just manifest from the luminiferous aether; they come from somewhere, meaning they are produced. Ergo, one must look at production over time, to see how that tracks against atmospheric concentrations of those same chemicals. Tracking ozone levels absent analysis of causative factors, nor the sources of ozone-depleting chemicals, is about as sensible as tracking atmospheric CO2 concentrations absent sources.

As three of the four graphs clearly state, they are about production. The first is about atmospheric concentrations of ODS's, and only the fourth is about emissions. CFC and HCFC production wasn't just stunted during the energy crisis, it decreased, which in turn would (and does) reflect accordingly in emissions and atmospheric concentrations.

Ozone depletion (if we take the Antarctic "hole" as a proxy) seems to have slackened off in the mid-late 1990s with gradual signs of recovery beginning in the 2000s, consistent with that cut in CFC production at the end of the 1980s.

CFC's and HCFC's don't teleport, neither are their effects instant. Increase to atmospheric concentrations of ODS's were already slowing -- a linear increase as opposed to exponential -- long before the Montreal Protocol would have had that impact.

The very best one might say about the Montreal Protocol, was that it expedited the transition from CFC's and HCFC's which was going to happen anyway due to intervening economic factors. Which, by the by, are entirely disregarded, borderline suppressed, in "world avoided" studies prefaced upon the notion ODS production would have continued indefinitely exponentially increasing at pre-'73 levels. And even then, it's a highly conditional statement given the agreement's lack of meaningful enforcing mechanisms which I already discussed.

It's like saying the prohibition of TEL caused the transition to catalytic converters and fuel injectors, or for that matter, the Cuban missile crisis caused the withdraw of MRBM's from Turkey and Italy.

 

[Agema]

Yes, that's my entire point. CFC's and HCFC's don't just manifest from the luminiferous aether; they come from somewhere, meaning they are produced. Ergo, one must look at production over time, to see how that tracks against atmospheric concentrations of those same chemicals. Tracking ozone levels absent analysis of causative factors, nor the sources of ozone-depleting chemicals, is about as sensible as tracking atmospheric CO2 concentrations absent sources.

As three of the four graphs clearly state, they are about production. The first is about atmospheric concentrations of ODS's, and only the fourth is about emissions. CFC and HCFC production wasn't just stunted during the energy crisis, it decreased, which in turn would (and does) reflect accordingly in emissions and atmospheric concentrations.

Atmospheric concentrations of CFCs are the result of two processes going on: release of CFCs, and clearance (breakdown and capture) of CFCs. If there's more release than clearance, CFC levels will go up. CFC clearance is very slow, such that it will take decades to clear a "reservoir" of CFCs built up in the atmosphere fully. Nevertheless, changes in atmospheric concentrations due to decreased release will be visible immediately. However, because of the very slow clearance of CFCs, this will initially be a levelling off of atmospheric CFC concentrations as release decreases, followed by a very gradual decline when the slow clerance processes eventually exceed release and the atmospheric "reservoir" is drained.

And this is exactly what we see. The Montreal Protocol kicks in late 80s to early 90s, CFC production and release drastically decreases, and over the course of the 90s-2000s atmospheric CFC levels accordingly stop rising and eventually go into decline.

If it were anything to do with the energy crash, we'd see a drastic levelling off in atmospheric CFCs immediately in the 1970s. However, the graph of atmospheric concentrations shows a continued, heavy increase from first measurement (1978) to ~1990. Thus even with the decline / stalling in CFC production starting early 70s, it's still greater than CFC clearance during that period.

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

Atmospheric concentrations of CFCs are the result of two processes going on: release of CFCs, and clearance (breakdown and capture) of CFCs. If there's more release than clearance, CFC levels will go up. CFC clearance is very slow, such that it will take decades to clear a "reservoir" of CFCs built up in the atmosphere fully. Nevertheless, changes in atmospheric concentrations due to decreased release will be visible immediately. However, because of the very slow clearance of CFCs, this will initially be a levelling off of atmospheric CFC concentrations as release decreases, followed by a very gradual decline when the slow clerance processes eventually exceed release and the atmospheric "reservoir" is drained.

And this is exactly what we see. The Montreal Protocol kicks in late 80s to early 90s, CFC production and release drastically decreases, and over the course of the 90s-2000s atmospheric CFC levels accordingly stop rising and eventually go into decline.

If it were anything to do with the energy crash, we'd see a drastic levelling off in atmospheric CFCs immediately in the 1970s. However, the graph of atmospheric concentrations shows a continued, heavy increase from first measurement (1978) to ~1990. Thus even with the decline / stalling in CFC production starting early 70s, it's still greater than CFC clearance during that period.

> It takes decades for atmospheric concentrations of CFC's to deplete, which is why it took twenty years for the MP to have an effect.

> If it were about the energy crisis, it would have had an immediate effect starting in the '70s.

Pick one.

Once again, CFC's don't teleport. They take years to reach the stratosphere, let alone be carried by the jet stream to concentrate at the poles in high enough proportions to deplete the ozone layer.

Now, that said, the difference is in a linear increase versus an exponential increase in atmospheric concentrations. That is a function of year-over-year changes in production -- a year-over-year increase in production equates to an exponential growth curve of atmospheric concentration. No change in year-over-year production equates to linear growth of atmospheric concentration. Reduction in year-over-year production equates to slower growth.

Which is exactly what happened from the late-'70s to approximately 1990. Atmospheric CFC concentrations were not increasing exponentially, they were increasing linearly (with a slight slowing of increase in the mid-'80s) because CFC production was not increasing year over year.

This is problem #1 with "world avoided" scenarios: they assume an exponential growth curve apropos of nothing, based on an indefinite increase in year-over-year CFC production. The lesson of the energy crisis and its impact on CFC production, is this assumption is bunk coming out of the starting gate because year-over-year CFC production had already stabilized.

And this is where "world avoided" scenarios completely collapse under the weight of their own illogic.

Good old-fashioned supply and demand. If a scientific model based on production of a commodity has to ignore basic economics to even appear viable, it's not. Assuming an exponential, indefinite growth curve of a commodity's production, assumes by necessity its market will continue growing exponentially and indefinitely.

 

[Agema]

> It takes decades for atmospheric concentrations of CFC's to deplete, which is why it took twenty years for the MP to have an effect.

> If it were about the energy crisis, it would have had an immediate effect starting in the '70s.

Pick one.

Once again, CFC's don't teleport. They take years to reach the stratosphere, let alone be carried by the jet stream to concentrate at the poles in high enough proportions to deplete the ozone layer.

You have two atmospheric compartments, the troposphere and the stratosphere. CFCs are released into the troposphere, and do their damage in the stratosphere. When small molecules are released into the air, they will be carried around by all the convection currents in the atmosphere. They can move hundreds of miles (laterally) in a day. After Chernobyl, for instance, Sweden was detecting the radiation within 48h. In effect, what is released locally will within a relatively short time frame of weeks be distributed globally. The distribution might not be uniform of course, but that's a digression.

Once in the troposphere, some CFCs will be degraded (but very, very slowly, as they're inert), some will be sequestered mostly in the ocean (but very slowly, because they're hydrophobic), and some will be moved up to the stratosphere by atmospheric currents. CFC molecules won't significantly diffuse up to the stratosphere without currents because they're heavier than air.

When we say it takes x years for CFCs to get to the stratosphere, this is a simplification. A specific CFC molecule could reach the stratosphere on the day it is released, if it catches the right currents. Another CFC molecule might not make to the stratosphere in 20 years or ever if it doesn't. The amount moved up will essentially be concentration dependent: the atmospheric current picks up a load of air (plus things like CFCs) and shifts it up. The more CFCs in the troposphere, the more will be transferred to the stratosphere. Once in the stratosphere, some CFCs will return back to the troposphere, and some will be broken down (at a faster rate than occurs in the troposphere).

All of these processes are continuously occurring, every second of every hour of every day of every year.

The rate of removal of CFCs from the troposphere is very slow, so any CFCs present will be around for a long time: the troposphere thus acts as a "reservoir" of CFCs that will persist long after release ceases. But by simple laws of physics, the minute the production rate of CFCs drops below the clearance rate, atmospheric concentrations will start to decline.

It might take longer for the ozone layer to recover, because that's dependent on the rate of breakdown of CFCs in the stratosphere. Atmospheric concentrations will slowly decrease, but may still be sufficiently high that enough is transferred into the stratosphere to break down ozone faster than ozone can be formed. Consequently, we may well expect a time lag from stopped CFC production to ozone recovery, as the "reservoir" of CFCs already in the atmosphere have to fall below a certain level.

Actually, this is all incredibly like pharmacokinetics.

Now, that said, the difference is in a linear increase versus an exponential increase in atmospheric concentrations. That is a function of year-over-year changes in production -- a year-over-year increase in production equates to an exponential growth curve of atmospheric concentration. No change in year-over-year production equates to linear growth of atmospheric concentration. Reduction in year-over-year production equates to slower growth.

Does it? That's quite an assumption.

The clearance of CFCs will be determined by chemical reactions - dissolving into solution, reacting and breaking down, etc. These, like all chemical reactions, are concentration-dependent processes: more reactants, faster reactions. Thus a linear growth in production year on year is not necessarily going to result in exponential atmospheric concentration growth, because clearance processes from the atmosphere may also increase.

This is perhaps a moot point, because your graph of atmospheric concentrations does indeed suggest linear growth, so this exponential growth thing looks like a straw man. And one way or another, CFC levels were clearly sufficient to degrade the ozone layer even back in the 70s.

 

[Seanchaidh]

Still waiting on this. CNN is blue Fox News. [tweet t="https://twitter.com/WalkerBragman/status/1246475505508978688"]

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

You have two atmospheric compartments, the troposphere and the stratosphere. CFCs are released into the troposphere, and do their damage in the stratosphere. When small molecules are released into the air, they will be carried around by all the convection currents in the atmosphere. They can move hundreds of miles (laterally) in a day. After Chernobyl, for instance, Sweden was detecting the radiation within 48h. In effect, what is released locally will within a relatively short time frame of weeks be distributed globally. The distribution might not be uniform of course, but that's a digression.

What the Swedes detected on 28 April was ejecta from the explosion itself. Why they thought it originated from an incident at one of their own reactors, was because they detected short-lived fission byproducts (Xe-135 if I remember right) that could not have originated from the Soviet Union (or even the UK) under non-explode-y circumstances because they would have decayed by the time they reached Sweden. That's how the Swedes knew, once they had ruled out an incident at one of their own reactors, something had to have gone catastrophically wrong at a power plant in the Soviet Union. Hell if I remember right, the Swedes' initial assumption was a reactor at Leningrad had exploded, and they never imagined they might detect ejecta from a reactor as far away as Ukraine.

It took particulates from the fire proper (i.e. the "fallout cloud") two weeks to reach Sweden. Ejecta from the explosion was also detected hundreds of miles away across and against prevailing winds as well, just to provide a sense of scale here -- that was the source of the Xe-135 detected at Cherepovets, for example. What happened, was the plasma jet and explosion accelerated particulates on a ballistic trajectory, at speeds better-compared to escape velocity than anything else, and prevailing winds didn't do much more than kinda aim it.

That's what you're comparing to gaseous emissions from more or less standard industrial activity. Now, back to the realm of reason.

You just said it yourself: gases in the atmosphere can move hundreds of miles in a day, but not laterally. Longitudinally. Because it is still carried by prevailing winds in whatever cell the gas originates. If it originates in the subtropics, it's carried by the Hadley cell to the doldrums, back through the Hadley cell to the horse latitudes; if it transitions to the Ferrel cell, or originates there, it has to transit through it to the polar front, then is it deposited by the polar cell at its destination. That "hundreds of miles" is more like "tens of thousands of miles"; it takes ODS's two years just to reach the stratosphere before it can even start that latitudinal journey.

That's why equatorial concentrations of ODS and ozone are so important to measuring the long-term impact of ozone depletion, by the way; northern and southern Hadley zones concentrate gaseous emissions along the intertropical convergence zone. That's 40% of the Earth's surface area, 36% of its landmass, and the location of damn near every RDC, that can be tracked by one metric. It also happens to by why even though polar ozone levels are replenishing, equatorial ozone levels are depleting. That all factors into HFC's contribution to ozone depletion by way of being a greenhouse gas and the Kigali amendment, which is a conversation for another point.

Have a shit-tier MSPaint visualization of how this works, assuming the worst-case scenario for most rapid transit.

This is perhaps a moot point, because your graph of atmospheric concentrations does indeed suggest linear growth, so this exponential growth thing looks like a straw man. And one way or another, CFC levels were clearly sufficient to degrade the ozone layer even back in the 70s.

That's why I take issue with "world avoided" scenarios, because they take for granted production would continue growing indefinitely and exponentially, ignoring basic economics. The energy crisis factors into this for a number of reasons, but here to show ODS's are/were not only price-elastic, but highly so. This means production is a function of demand, and there is a point of market saturation which will dictate peak production. By definition, this means production could not nor would ever grow exponentially or indefinitely as assumed by "world avoided" scenarios, and to wit "world avoided" scenarios don't even model hypothetical production as a factor of historic real-world demand, influenced as it was by market-based transitions to more efficient technologies, and cheaper replacement or analog products, not even under the Montreal Protocol's purview.

What I was on about a page ago, is most of those replacement and analog products are petroleum products. Which is the other side of the energy crisis' impact: when the energy crisis ended petrol prices dropped, and so did the price of petroleum products -- including CFC replacements. Because HCFC's and HFC's are petroleum products (specifically, they're synthesized from ethane, propane, and naphtha if I remember right).

 

[Marik2]

CNN is blue Fox News. [tweet t="https://twitter.com/WalkerBragman/status/1246475505508978688"]

You just figured that out?

 

[Seanchaidh]

CNN is blue Fox News. [tweet t="https://twitter.com/WalkerBragman/status/1246475505508978688"]

You just figured that out?

No, but it bears repeating.

 

[Agema]

That's what you're comparing to gaseous emissions from more or less standard industrial activity. Now, back to the realm of reason.

a) The nuclear reactor accident blasted a load of radioactive material into the sky, and it was caught on the wind and blew off to Sweden, arriving about 48h later. It didn't reach there by the force of the explosion alone. If it did, by your own reasoning it would have been there in a few minutes given that escape velocity is ~25,000mph.
b) To expand: a middling breeze on the Beaufort scale is ~20mph. 24h of that is 480 miles.
c) To further expand by example, it took ~10 days for radiation from Fukushima to reach California through the atmosphere, 5000 miles away.

So yes, in a timescale of weeks, any small enough particulates and gases punted into the atmosphere can go pretty much global.

You just said it yourself: gases in the atmosphere can move hundreds of miles in a day, but not laterally. Longitudinally.

I'm not a geographer. From my perspective lateral merely means sideways (that is, parallel to the surface of the Earth); as opposed to up/down.

snip

That is pretty much all tangential. The bottom line is that that the drop in CFC atmospheric concentrations cannot be reasonably attributed to the energy crisis, but very much can to vastly reduced production due to political pressure and the Montreal Protocol. What you're discussing with price elasticity and theoretical models of continued growth in CFC production aren't really relevant to anything anyone here is arguing. Fact remains, the Montreal Protocol was highly successful in its aim of cutting CFC production.

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

a) The nuclear reactor accident blasted a load of radioactive material into the sky, and it was caught on the wind and blew off to Sweden, arriving about 48h later. It didn't reach there by the force of the explosion alone. If it did, by your own reasoning it would have been there in a few minutes given that escape velocity is ~25,000mph.

Better compared to escape velocity, not at escape velocity. Because you don't seem entirely cognizant of the sheer forces involved in that explosion; the explosion may not have been a "nuclear explosion" as traditionally understood (a controlled prompt-criticality incident), but it still exploded at an estimated 300tn yield making it equivalent to a tactical nuclear weapon. Almost all of that force being directed upwards, turning it into a shaped charge of nuclear-equivalent yield. I would remind you that explosion was powerful enough to launch a thousand-ton disk of concrete and lead, and everything attached to that disk, several stories into the air and through the roof of its reactor hall like a coin.

Furthermore, wind only blew from a southeasterly direction for part of 27 April; afterwards, it blew from a northwesterly direction which is why this happened:

That map tracks the plume of smoke from the fire itself. Never mind the composition of the particulate matter initially detected in Sweden correlates it directly to the explosion itself; we know for a fact that was ejecta, end of story, because in any other circumstance it would have decayed into stabler particles before reaching Sweden. That was particulate matter ejected by the plasma jet and explosion on a ballistic trajectory, which was only influenced by the wind that evening. Like I said, ejecta was detected at Cherepovets as well, which was crosswind that morning and against prevailing winds later.

Thanks to (approximately) this:

Which is what you're comparing to this:

Jet stream patterns fluctuate wildly in the subarctic latitudes in spring and fall, especially compared to the subtropical jet stream, who knew!

I'm not a geographer.

Yet you want to lecture me on jet stream patterns, prevailing winds, and atmospheric circulation.

What you're discussing with price elasticity and theoretical models of continued growth in CFC production aren't really relevant to anything anyone here is arguing.

Oh yes, discussing production of industrial commodities, has no relevance in a discussion about production of industrial commodities. Look, it's not my fault arguments to defend the Montreal Protocol only work in a parallel universe in which economics doesn't exist, I'm just the messenger here.

 

[Agema]

Better compared to escape velocity, not at escape velocity. Because you don't seem entirely cognizant of the sheer forces involved in that explosion; the explosion may not have been a "nuclear explosion" as traditionally understood (a controlled prompt-criticality incident), but it still exploded at an estimated 300tn yield making it equivalent to a tactical nuclear weapon. Almost all of that force being directed upwards, turning it into a shaped charge of nuclear-equivalent yield. I would remind you that explosion was powerful enough to launch a thousand-ton disk of concrete and lead, and everything attached to that disk, several stories into the air and through the roof of its reactor hall like a coin.

Facts are more useful when they actually help you answer the question in hand. Otherwise you're just filling up space with pointless digression nobody's interested in.

F=ma and all that will certainly shift a small particle very quickly after a big explosion, but the air also provides substantial resistance. Like the way a feather is lighter than a pebble, but you can throw a pebble much further than a feather. No, you are not going to meaningfully fire enough tiny particles 700 miles even with a Chernobyl-size explosion. And if you did, at the speed of a bullet, it would still arrive in Sweden in less than one hour which doesn't explain the 2 days it took for Sweden to register the radiation. 700 miles in 1-2 days is about 15-30mph... so wind and diffusion, then.

Furthermore, wind only blew from a southeasterly direction for part of 27 April; afterwards, it blew from a northwesterly direction which is why this happened:

Whether it's explosion ejecta or from the subsequent fire matters not at all. It's still particulates caught in the wind.

I can only presume you have selected that figure from the many potentially available because it doesn't really explain the full scope of the spread. Try checking some more, e.g.:
https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/05647/chernobyl

Yet you want to lecture me on jet stream patterns, prevailing winds, and atmospheric circulation.

Don't be pettily aggressive and unfair. I have not gone into any of these things, I've just pointed out the obvious common sense fact that winds blow and can move stuff in the atmosphere large distances in relatively short periods. And don't you dare be so hypocritical about "lecturing", given the way you are behaving in this thread.

Oh yes, discussing production of industrial commodities, has no relevance in a discussion about production of industrial commodities. Look, it's not my fault arguments to defend the Montreal Protocol only work in a parallel universe in which economics doesn't exist, I'm just the messenger here.

Yes, but none of those explanations about production of industrial commodities has effectively disproven that the Montreal Protocol was instrumental in reducing CFC emissions. Lots of facts that surround the issue without ever answering it.

 

[Eacaraxe_v1legacy]

F=ma and all that will certainly shift a small particle very quickly after a big explosion, but the air also provides substantial resistance. Like the way a feather is lighter than a pebble, but you can throw a pebble much further than a feather. No, you are not going to meaningfully fire enough tiny particles 700 miles even with a Chernobyl-size explosion. And if you did, at the speed of a bullet, it would still arrive in Sweden in less than one hour which doesn't explain the 2 days it took for Sweden to register the radiation. 700 miles in 1-2 days is about 15-30mph... so wind and diffusion, then.

No, just powerful enough to launch particulate matter to altitudes with substantially lower air pressure, and slightly reduced gravity (nobody ever seems to take note of that), in seconds. As compared to what you were trying to compare it to, gaseous emissions from industrial activity that take years merely to reach that altitude in the first place. You're comparing go-karts to rockets, treating the go-kart like a rocket and vice versa when it suits your argument, but not actually cognizant of that.

Which is my point in showing how and why ejecta from the explosion -- which we know was ejecta due to its isotopic ratios, that you continually refuse to acknowledge -- reached Sweden in days as opposed to the weeks it took the radioactive smoke plume from the fire to reach Sweden.

Whether it's explosion ejecta or from the subsequent fire matters not at all. It's still particulates caught in the wind.

Yeah you can keep telling yourself all you want. Me, I'll rest confident in my ability to tell the difference between particulates yeeted straight to high altitude by an impromptu nuclear rocket engine definitively proven to have been such 34 years ago, smoke from a giant fire after the nuclear rocket engine tuckered out, and gases released at no particular velocity from industrial equipment.

I can only presume you have selected that figure from the many potentially available because it doesn't really explain the full scope of the spread.

MF'er I'm the one pointing out ejecta and fallout was detected hundreds of miles away against prevailing winds. You don't get more "explaining the full scope of the spread" than that. But it's cool, you got this, you have an infographic talking about I-131 contamination when I-131 contamination was not the problem in Sweden [https://www.stralsakerhetsmyndigheten.se/contentassets/66f4f029351d4baea989543f24414795/198612-chernobyl---its-impact-on-sweden]. The most stringent response on the Swedish government's part to I-131 contamination was a moratorium on dairy cattle grazing that wasn't even necessary for most of the country, while inactive iodine tablets were never distributed nor their use recommended. Sr-90, Cs-134, and Cs-137 were the problem in Sweden, because they were carried by the plume from the fire and arrived two weeks later.

Don't be pettily aggressive and unfair.

I'm being precisely as assertive and charitable as the situation deserves.

I've just pointed out the obvious common sense fact that winds blow and can move stuff in the atmosphere large distances in relatively short periods.

And I'm pointing out why and how your examples are outstandingly poor. Because your "obvious common sense", is neither obvious nor common.

Yes, but none of those explanations about production of industrial commodities has effectively disproven that the Montreal Protocol was instrumental in reducing CFC emissions. Lots of facts that surround the issue without ever answering it.

My argument was the market for CFC's was going to collapse anyways, because the price of oil dropped and CFC replacement products became cheaper, being petroleum products and all. Further technological developments in the '90s, particularly in the realm of plastics manufacture (another petrol product) and the development of safer, cheaper, more efficient, and more secure products, cut gross demand for industrial refrigerants, solvents, and propellants. That's why there was no problem with enforcement for twenty years until fracking and Chinese CFC production, and now that there is, it's been proven the impotent paper tiger it always was.

The absolute best-case scenario for the Montreal Protocol is it expedited that market transition; the worst-case, and frankly more likely given the massive "oh shit, we fucked up" that was the Kigali Amendment, was that it forced premature mass global production of AGW-accelerating hydrocarbons that depleted ozone levels anyways.