Posting in chunks because it doesn't want to post the whole thing...
wait, sorry, that didn't come out right. What I mean to say is,
THE UNITED STATES BROKE IT EARLIER and NATO membership would make all the provisions that apply to Ukraine's advantage superfluous, so it is perfectly reasonable to suspect they wouldn't keep the agreement (especially considering, I must remind you, that the United States had already helped overturn a democratic by US standards election in Ukraine in order to get its way). There is also the prospect of using Ukraine as a platform to strike at Russian nuclear weapons with conventional munitions to precede a first nuclear strike. And something I didn't think about in detail until more recently is that the Warsaw Pact enjoyed a much thinner effective front with the West in Europe because of the Carpathian mountains, whereas Russia in the current situation has a gigantic border through a gigantic plain; the plain is much thinner in Poland and Germany, but opens out the further east you go. On top of that, Belarus would be an indefensible bulge should there be a conflict with Ukraine on NATO's side.
There seem to be too many ways for a Ukraine in NATO to lead to either a decisive military advantage with nuclear arms or conventional arms or a perception of such an advantage that ends up ending the world as we know it. Is that Ukraine's fault? Not at all. But it seems to be a geographical reality. And based on that geographical reality, I'd expect Russia has designs on Moldova too (nevermind Lukaschenko's apparent reveal). The west should negotiate a neutral Ukraine before that's relevant in my opinion-- I suspect the United States would rather Ukraine just lose, though. Russia gets its more defensible position, the United States gets an affirmation that there is a new cold war. Which it actually wants, because it is structurally psychopathic. Also some other dubious benefits, material and psychological. Ukraine suffers if Putin intends to keep the western part (and grants Hillary Clinton's apparent wish for an opportunity to repeat the history of American support for the Afghan mujahideen), but none of the great powers really gave a shit about that in the first place.
Now, this is kind of a subtle point, but the people in Crimea and the Donbass do actually have rights to self-determination that would supercede agreements made between Ukraine and others should those people decide that they want out of Ukraine. And the hypocrisy (Chechnya) of those who might help them is not an argument against their rights. Is it not necessarily true that the DPR/LPR represent all the people of Donetsk and Luhansk? Sure. Is the Crimean referendum disputed? Yes; in fact, it seemed to not include an important third choice. But not necessarily true does not mean false, and a referendum being kind of shitty doesn't make its result one that the people must necessarily disagree with. Maybe that's a sore subject for a Remainer, though.
The United States broke it earlier
wait, sorry, that didn't come out right. What I mean to say is,
THE UNITED STATES BROKE IT EARLIER and NATO membership would make all the provisions that apply to Ukraine's advantage superfluous, so it is perfectly reasonable to suspect they wouldn't keep the agreement (especially considering, I must remind you, that the United States had already helped overturn a democratic by US standards election in Ukraine in order to get its way). There is also the prospect of using Ukraine as a platform to strike at Russian nuclear weapons with conventional munitions to precede a first nuclear strike. And something I didn't think about in detail until more recently is that the Warsaw Pact enjoyed a much thinner effective front with the West in Europe because of the Carpathian mountains, whereas Russia in the current situation has a gigantic border through a gigantic plain; the plain is much thinner in Poland and Germany, but opens out the further east you go. On top of that, Belarus would be an indefensible bulge should there be a conflict with Ukraine on NATO's side.
There seem to be too many ways for a Ukraine in NATO to lead to either a decisive military advantage with nuclear arms or conventional arms or a perception of such an advantage that ends up ending the world as we know it. Is that Ukraine's fault? Not at all. But it seems to be a geographical reality. And based on that geographical reality, I'd expect Russia has designs on Moldova too (nevermind Lukaschenko's apparent reveal). The west should negotiate a neutral Ukraine before that's relevant in my opinion-- I suspect the United States would rather Ukraine just lose, though. Russia gets its more defensible position, the United States gets an affirmation that there is a new cold war. Which it actually wants, because it is structurally psychopathic. Also some other dubious benefits, material and psychological. Ukraine suffers if Putin intends to keep the western part (and grants Hillary Clinton's apparent wish for an opportunity to repeat the history of American support for the Afghan mujahideen), but none of the great powers really gave a shit about that in the first place.
Much like I stuck by the agreement outlined in a receipt from thirty years ago. By having paid thirty years ago. On the other hand the United States meddled quite ferociously in Ukraine's government, not only with sanctions against Yanukovych but also by participating in and legitimizing an unconstitutional coup (they plainly didn't have the fairly high number required to oust Yanukovych by parliamentary vote, but that didn't matter to the US and Europeans or the western press; they got their desired outcome, so process-- which is also to say agreements-- be damned). In response to that coup, which involved domestic neo-Nazis and foreign support, there were breakaway sentiments in the more Russian parts of Ukraine. And Russia took advantage of that. And Ukraine shut off Crimea's water for eight years (until Russia restored it during the invasion).
Now, this is kind of a subtle point, but the people in Crimea and the Donbass do actually have rights to self-determination that would supercede agreements made between Ukraine and others should those people decide that they want out of Ukraine. And the hypocrisy (Chechnya) of those who might help them is not an argument against their rights. Is it not necessarily true that the DPR/LPR represent all the people of Donetsk and Luhansk? Sure. Is the Crimean referendum disputed? Yes; in fact, it seemed to not include an important third choice. But not necessarily true does not mean false, and a referendum being kind of shitty doesn't make its result one that the people must necessarily disagree with. Maybe that's a sore subject for a Remainer, though.
